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The greater part of what my neighbors call
good I believe in my soul to be bad, and if I repent of anything, it is very
likely to be my good behavior. What demon possessed me that I behaved so well?
-H.D. Thoreau, WALDEN, Ch. 1








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The R-theory of Time,
or Replacement Presentism:
The Buddhist Philosophy of Time
By Jeffrey Grupp,
2005
Purdue
University
(
http://www.abstractatom.com )
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Published in:
The Indian International Journal of Buddhist
Studies (IIJBS)
No. 6, 2005, pp. 51-122
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This article was refereed by
Roger Jackson of Carlton
College, and I had help with the physics involved in the article from both
Paul Pancella
(Chair of Physics at Western Michigan University) and
Quentin Smith (Philosophy
Professor at Western Michigan University) |
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The R-theory of Time,
or Replacement Presentism:
The Buddhist Philosophy of Time
Jeffrey Grupp
Abstract
I argue that the
Indian Buddhist theory of time should be called the R-theory of time, and
I show that the Indian Buddhist philosophy of time may be a better
philosophy of time than any of the non-Buddhist accounts of time. It is a
common assumption among non-Buddhist philosophers, such as Western
analytic metaphysicians, that there can be relations between times. I
however show that there cannot be any temporal relations. This does not
harm the R-theory of time, since it does not involve relations between
times, and thus it avoids problems I will point out to do with the
temporal relations of many non-Buddhist theories of time. The R-theory of
time also avoids the (perhaps insoluble) problem of change and identity of
objects over time (object m can remain itself through change and can
persist through time), as it is referred to by Western philosophers, and
which is typically addressed in the West in the philosophies of
endurantism and perdurantism. These are problems that are however found
only in non-Buddhist theories of time, such as the theories of time that
are widely discussed in contemporary Western metaphysics. Since the
Buddhist philosophy of time does not involve issues of endurance or
perdurance, and, I will argue, does not involve the interconnectedness of
any different moments, I will argue that it may be the case that the
R-theory of time is the best theory of time we have. I will further argue
that science and philosophy appear to support the R-theory of time; and
endurantism and perdurantism appear to not be supported by science and
logic. I will also discuss Buddhist atomism, and give a novel account of
it that apparently reveals why ultimate reality must involve replacing
present moments.
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52 The Indian
International Journal of Buddhist Studies 6, 2005
1. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to show that the Indian Buddhist philosophy
of time may be a good alternative to the other philosophies of time,
including the modern theories of time found in the Western tradition (the
A-, B-, and pure A- theories of time[1]).
The main characteristic that distinguishes the Indian Buddhist theory of
time from non-Buddhist theories of time is that, unlike non-Buddhist
theories of time, according to the Buddhist theory the present replaces.
Yandell discusses the position that time consists of replaced present
moments, according to the Buddhist theory of time:
The Buddhist view goes as follows. A core Buddhist doctrine is that
everything is impermanent. Hence persons are impermanent. At a time, a
person is one or more purely momentary states. Over time, a person is a
series of such bundles…. Strictly speaking, for the Buddhist the world’s
history is a matter of one set of states being replaced by another
set which in turn is replaced by another. (Yandell, 1999:5)
(Emphasis added.)
The Indian Buddhist philosophy of time is rarely brought up by philosophers
outside the Indian tradition as a serious contender for the correct theory
of time. But in this article I will argue that there may be reasons that
show that the Buddhist theory is perhaps the best philosophy of time we
currently have. These reasons are as follows.
(1) Non-Buddhist theories of time, which
do not involve a replacing present, typically involve the interconnection
of, and/or the contacting (attaching, abutting, continuous integrating) of,
moments, which I will argue in section 2 are impossible. (Some Buddhist
theories of time do involve contact or real [rather than imagined or
conceptual] interrelatedness between moments. If my reasoning in this

[1]
The Pure A-theory is now typically referred to as “presentism” (only the
present exists, the past and future do not exist) by Western philosophers.
But I will not call it by that name, and I will use the original name,
“pure A-theory, since “presentism” has many varieties, one of which is the
Buddhist theory of time, and not just the contemporary Western version.
Western metaphysicians typically pass over this issue, as if there is just
one variety of presentism. “Pure A-theory” then denotes the specifically
Western account of presentism.
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53
article is correct, these varieties of Buddhism are apparently incorrect.)
(2) Non-Buddhist theories of time, which
do not involve a replacing present, involve the (alleged) persistence and
identity of objects that change through time, but these theories may fail to
explain the persistence and identity of changing objects over time.[2]
I will argue that the problems described in (1) and (2) are very serious,
and since the Buddhist philosophy of time is the only theory of time that
can be considered not to involve (1) and (2), this shows that the Buddhist
philosophy of time is the best we currently have.
In this first section I introduce the R-theory in more detail. In sections 2
and 3 I will argue that points (1) and (2) above may imply that the R-theory
is the correct philosophy of time.
1.1 The Doctrine of Momentariness
For
reasons I give in section 2 I will call the Indian Buddhist theory of time
the R-theory of time. I will discuss how the R-theory of time is a
theory of time that involves the doctrine of momentariness found in
Indian Buddhism (just “Buddhism” hereafter[3]).[4]
According

[2]
Interestingly, regarding (2), its threat has seemed so
serious to some that (2) has driven a few of the Western philosophers to
attempt to describe change and identity over time by way of
inconsistency and paradox, as if reality really contained
inconsistencies not invented by the human mind. (See Mortensen 2002.)
[3]
I refer to the R-theory of time as the Buddhist
theory of time. But the R-theory is really mostly in accord with Buddhism
in the Indian tradition. A philosophy of an eternal, unchanging,
ultimate reality, which was espoused by many later non-Indian forms of
Buddhism, was specifically denied by Sākyamuni. So the R-theory is not in
accord with some of the later forms of Buddhism, such as Tendai. (For
discussion of these issues see Swanson 1997.) I will nevertheless refer to
the R-theory (replacement presentism) as the Buddhist theory of
time, since it is in accord with the Indian Buddhists, such as Dharmakīrti
and others, and since a philosophy of replacing presents is also
how others discuss “the Buddhist theory.” For example, this is how Yandell
referred to “the Buddhist view” in the passage of his I cited at the start
of this article, where he refers to the replacement of presents as
the Buddhist position, even though it is a reference mainly to
Buddhism in the Indian tradition.
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The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 6, 2005
to the doctrine of momentariness, if an object m changes, whereby it
is no longer m but is m*, m is destroyed and m*
comes into existence. If the doctrine of momentariness is an account that
gives a correct description of any object, including all of reality, then no
entity persists through time, and I will explain in the next paragraph that
all entities that make up reality only exist for a durationless instant.
This is the position that was held by Buddha:
How can there be laughter, how can there be pleasure, when the whole world
is burning? When you are in deep darkness, will you not ask for a lamp?
Consider this body! A painted puppet with jointed limbs, sometimes suffering
and covered with ulcers, full of imaginings, never permanent, for ever
changing.[5]
The
doctrine of momentariness can be more fully explained if I discuss motion.
The Buddhist holds that, as Sāntiraksita puts it, “[t]he essence of reality
is motion.”[6]
This is supported by the theories of quantum physics, according to which
reality consists of particles in motion.[7]
If the quantum particles that make up reality are in motion, then all of
reality is activity and movement,[8]
just as the Buddhist maintains. If the essence of reality is motion, it
appears that reality

[4]
There is one rarely discussed Western and non-Buddhist philosophy of change
and time that involves momentariness. It was held by the ancient Greek
Cyrenaic School. (See Tsouna 1998.) The physicists Neils Bohr may also have
espoused with momentariness; I will discuss Bohr later in this article. And
in 3.1 I discuss how much of modern physics may predict that momentariness
is the correct account.
[5]
Dhammapada. 1973. New York: Penguin
Books. Verses 146-147.
[6]
Sāntiraksita, Tattvasamgraha, 138.9. Quoted in Stcherbatsky, F. Th.
1962 (1930). Buddhist Logic. Volume 1. New York: Dover. Page 82.
[7]
What is meant by “motion” will be discussed more below.
[8]
The idea that change is the essence of reality is also
found in the ancient Greek philosopher, Heraclitus. Stcherbatsky writes:
The idea that there is no stability in the external world and that existence
is nothing but a flow of external becoming, is familiar to us from the
history of Greek philosophy where in… Heraclitus it marks an episode in its
early period, an episode which was soon forgotten in the subsequent
development of Greek thought. (Stcherbatsky Vol. 1, 1962 (1930), 82.)
(Emphasis added.)
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must in fact consist of constant change. Thus all items of reality, and
reality itself, obey the doctrine of momentariness, where the items of
reality, exist for a durationless instant, and are destroyed. If this is the
case, then all of reality is momentary, regardless of whether or not
humans believe they perceive stable, motionless, persisting objects, such as
a cup resting on a table in a still room. (In a section below I will discuss
an objection to the idea that if quantum particles change then the
macroscopic objects made of the particles must also change.) An experience
of persistence and stability would merely be a mental error, if the R-theory
is a correct theory of time. Observers, which are also momentary, can
perceive the moments one after the other, but the non-nirvanic observer is
unaware of the emptiness (durationlessness, impermanence) of all things, and
instead erroneously perceives objects persisting through time. Brown writes:
The thickness of a moment is conceived as a durationless point… The duration
of the moment is bound up with a theory of momentary states of consciousness
that are the phenomenal equivalents of atomic point-instants. Consciousness
and the duration of conscious experience are thought-constructions of the…
similarities of the momentary flashings… [D]uration is added by the mind to
the series of changing points… It is not sufficient, however, to argue that
duration is a contribution of the mind to entities that are durationless.
Such entities depend on the cognitive laws that govern the process of
“thought-construction,” and these laws are as yet unknown (Brown 1999:263).
Temporal duration and the identity of objects through time do not exist
outside of imagination. They are merely the mental constructions of the
non-nirvanic mind. Actual reality involves no real duration, no
real time-flow, no events that are side-by-side one another where some
events are past, others are future, and one is present. Rather, according to
the R-theory of time, temporal duration, change, and identity of objects
over time, are fabricated experiences of the specious present,[9]
constructed and believed to exist by the non-

[9]
Le Poidevin lucidly clarifies what is meant by this phrase:
The term ‘specious present’ was first introduced by the psychologist E.R.
Clay, but the best known characterisation of it was due to William James,
widely regarded as one of the founders of modern psychology. He lived from
1842 to 1910, and was professor of philosophy at
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The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 6, 2005
nirvanic observer. There are only present moments existing
one-after-the-other, flashing in and out of existence: present p1
is replaced by present p2, p2 is replaced by p3,
p3 by p4, and so on. Mookerjee explains:
The theory of flux holds that all existents are momentary, existing only for
the moment and disappearing…, in which [a]… facsimile of the previous entity
crops up. This process of duplication and re-duplication goes on for any
length of time and this is the reason why entities are prima facie
looked upon as continuous. In reality, however, there have been many
entities, one similar to the other, and this similarity in appearance is
mistaken for their unchanged identity. This is so far an intelligible
position. The real difficulty, however, crops up when a dissimilar entity
emerges, as, for instance when the seed-series disappears and a different
series in the shape of the sprout springs into being (Mookerjee 1935:39).
What Mookerjee calls the duplication process, and what
Yandell and I call the replacement of presents, give rise to the
non-nirvanic illusion of the experience of persisting and/or unchanging

Harvard. His
definition of the specious present goes as follows: ‘the prototype of all
conceived times is the specious present, the short duration of which we are
immediately and incessantly sensible’ (James (1890))… Elsewhere in the same
work, James asserts ‘We are constantly aware of a certain duration-the
specious present-varying from a few seconds to probably not more than a
minute, and this duration (with its content perceived as having one part
earlier and another part later) is the original intuition of time.’ This
surprising variation in the length of the specious present makes one suspect
that more than one definition is hidden in James' rather vague
characterisation. One could define it, for example, as the extent of
short-term memory, in which case it might well vary from person to person,
and also from one sense modality to another. Or it might be the interval in
which information is experienced as a single unit (say a sentence, or
musical phrase)-a rather ambiguous and unsatisfactory definition. A quite
different definition is this: the interval of time such that events
occurring within that interval are experienced as present. This is how the
specious present tends to be treated in recent discussions, though it is
inconsistent with James' remark that we can discern earlier and later parts
in the specious present. As we remarked at the beginning of this article, if
two events are experienced as present, they are surely experienced as
simultaneous. (Le Poidevin 2003)
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objects, such as when one looks at a cup resting on a table in a still room
and believes it to be unchanging and motionless while existing through a
duration. In the present the non-nirvanic observer recollects experiences of
the cup from moments which now do not exist. Through memory the
non-nirvanic observer compares and combines experiences of the cup at
different moments, which have been replaced, in order to create the illusion
of a cup that persists through time.
1.2 Overview of Article
The reader should note that I am a Western analytic philosopher, and for
that reason this article may inevitably appear, to some degree, to be from
the perspective and writing style of a Western philosopher. But I am also
quite familiar with Buddhist philosophy, and I assert that my background in
Western analytic metaphysics does not harm my analysis of Buddhist
philosophy.
In section 2 I argue that if moments could exist side-by-side one another,
like the beads of a pearl necklace, as is held in most philosophies of time
in the contemporary Western tradition (the A-theory and the B-theory), then
on that account, the moments that are side-by-side cannot be connected
to one another, and they cannot be in contact with one another. I
will further argue that this may show that presentism (the position
that the past and future do not exist) is the correct theory of time. Then I
will argue that if presentism is the correct theory, and if there is change
(i.e., if the present changes), then it can only be the case that the
present replaces, which is the distinct feature of the Buddhist
philosophy of time.
In section 3 I discuss how the R-theory of time avoids the
Western debates on endurantism and perdurantism. The endurantism and
perdurantism debates are specifically aimed at attempting to avoid
the doctrine of momentariness and the problem of change: they are attempts
to explain the persistence and identity of changing objects
through time. I argue that the drive to solve the problem of change
and identity over time, and to get around the doctrine of momentariness, is
generated by what the widely discussed Western philosopher Michael Loux
calls “prephilosophical intuition.”[10]
I will describe what Loux means by this, and I will argue that the placing
of such importance on prephilosophical

[10]
Loux 1998, 324. I will give Loux’s full citation in section 3.
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58 The Indian
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intuition is unwarranted, and it is science and logic, rather than
prephilosophical intuition, that give us successful theories for describing
reality. Furthermore, I will argue that science and logic support the
R-theory and do not support prephilosophical intuition. For those
reasons, which will be given in more detail in section 3, I will find that
the R-theory may be a better theory than the non-Buddhist theories that are
based on endurantism and perdurantism.
In section 4 I discuss how a group of Western metaphysicians called bare
particular theorists may believe they can avoid the doctrine of
momentariness and the R-theory. But I will find problems with their account.
In the conclusion I will argue that a novel approach to Buddhist atomism
that I will give explains why presents replace.
2. The R-Theory of Time
In this section I will argue that presentism must be the correct theory of
time, and I will argue that the correct variety of presentism is one where
the present replaces itself. Since such a theory is in accord with
the Buddhist philosophy of momentariness, then if my argumentation in this
section is correct, it reveals that the Buddhist theory of time is the
correct theory of time.
2.1 The R-theory
I
will give the Buddhist theory of time two names. The first name is, as
mentioned, the R-theory of time (where “R” stands for “replacement”).
I use this label in order to put the Buddhist theory of time more in line
with the names given to the existing theories of time in the metaphysics of
the Western tradition. The theories of time in the Western tradition are the
A-theory of time, the B-theory of time, and the Pure A-
theory of time.[11]
Oaklander describes the A- and B-theories:
…[T]ime [involves]
events strung out along a series united to one another by the relations of
earlier than, later and simultaneity… The events in the
temporal series are fixed in that they never change their position relative
to each other… It has become customary to call the entire series of events
spread out along the time-line from earlier to later, the “B-
[11]
Western metaphysicians also discuss mixtures of these.
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series.” When
viewed solely in terms of the B-series, time is thought of as static
or unchanging for there is nothing about temporal relations between events
that changes...
Time not only has a static aspect, it also has a transitory aspect.
In addition to conceiving of time in terms of events standing in temporal
relations, we also conceive of time and the events in time as moving or
passing from the far future to the near future, from the hear future to the
present, and then from present they recede into the more and more distant
past… When events are ordered in terms of the notions of past, present, or
future they form what is called an “A-series.” It should be noted, of
course, that the A- and B-series are not really “two” different series of
events, but the same series ordered in two different ways (Oaklander, 1995 :
69).
The phase “pure A-theory” has been largely equated with the term
“presentism” in recent years. It is the position that only the present
exists. Oaklander discusses it in a passage about the account of the pure
A-theory espoused by William Lane Craig, a major philosopher of time in the
West:
Craig’s version of the pure A-theory, known as “presentism,” purports to
avoid… the problem of change... According to presentism, only the present
exists. Thus, it is not the case that, say, O is green and [then] O is red
[if, for example, O is a tomato] (Oaklander, 2004 : 27).
(Note how Oaklander points out that Craig endorses presentism because Craig
wishes to avoid the problem of change: the problem of
explaining how there can be persistence and identity of changing objects
through time. Western philosophers typically call this “the problem
of change” because it is standard for Western metaphysicians to hold that
momentariness is not the correct account of reality, but it is also
widely acknowledged that it is unclear how to describe change without
momentariness. This demonstrates how persistence and identity of changing
objects over time are recognized as being problems that are unsolved,
despite what the endurantists and the perdurantists assert to the contrary.
I will discuss this in section 3.)
The pure A-theory of the Western metaphysicians is alleged to be a
presentist theory. But if it is, it is not the same variety of
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60 The Indian
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presentism as Buddhist presentism, since the Buddhists’ account involves a
momentary replacing present, but the Western metaphysician’s pure
A-theory does not.
Typically Western metaphysicians only recognize the A-, B-, and pure
A-theories of time, and ignore the Buddhist theory of time. In the following
passage, consider how Oaklander writes about “the nature of time”, and how
there is no mention of any theories but A- and B-theories. (In the passage,
Oaklander does not bring up pure A-theory because Western
metaphysician typically consider it a type of A-theory, and thus it is
considered to (somehow) be a tensed theory of time—but how
this could be is questioned by many.)
One of the most hotly contested issues in metaphysics today concerns the
debate between those who hold the tensed theory or A-theory of time, [and]
those who hold the tenseless or B-theory of time... The debate between these
three theories concerns the question of whether the ultimate metaphysical
nature of time is to be understood in terms of temporal becoming, temporal
relations, or both temporal become and temporal relations (Oaklander, 2004 :
27).
As mentioned, the distinction that the R-theory of time has from the A-, B-,
and pure A-theories of time, and any other non-Buddhist theories, is that
the non-Buddhist theories of time all do not involve a replacing
present. Also, unlike the R-theory, the A- and B-theories of time are not
presentist theories of time. And another distinction between the
Buddhist theory of time and the non-Buddhist theories of time, including the
A-, B-, and pure A-theories, is that the non-Buddhist theories typically do
not hold that the endurance or perdurance of objects is illusory.
2.2 Replacement Presentism
The second name I give to the Buddhist theory of time is replacement
presentism. I use the term “presentism” since, according to Buddhism and
the doctrine of momentariness, only the present exists due to the fact that
only one moment ever exists. The reason there are no moments before or after
the present is because, in a theory of time and change based on
momentariness, where moments are destroyed and copies of moments come into
being, the destruction of one moment and the creation of another indicates
that there can
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only ever be one moment. I argue why this is the case in much more detail in
this subsection.
I use the word “replacement” because if there is no persistence, there
cannot be two moments side-by-side in time lest there be a possibility that
in some pair of moments that are side-by-side somehow the same object shows
up in each moment and thus persists. If there were, for example, two
moments next to one another, this would mean that a given moment is not
destroyed when a following moment comes into being, and instead when one
moment comes into being, there is a moment before it that has not been
destroyed. This is not the Buddhist position since it could violate the
logic of Buddhist momentariness. But if it were instead that case that there
is only one moment that ever exists, and two moments can never exist
side-by-side, then it can only be the case that one present moment (p1)
is completely replaced by another (p2). If only one moment ever
exists it can only be a present since it is a now, and since
there are no moments before or after it to make it a past or future.
If moments exist side-by-side (i.e., if presentism is false), it seems that
the non-Buddhist philosopher can justifiably disagree with the
Buddhist position that there is no carryover or “temporal overflow” (King,
1963 : 124) of an object from one moment to the next, whereby there could be
persistence. It would however be impossible for there to be any possibility
of there being persistence of some object from one moment to a following
moment if it were found that there are not any moments that can be
side-by-side. I will show that moments apparently cannot be connected or in
contact in any way, and then I will argue that this conclusion leads to the
position that there is only one moment.
If moments exist side-by-side in the non-Buddhistic way just mentioned, they
apparently do so in one of two ways:
i)
The moments that are side-by-side one another abut or contact
one another, or if they do not abut or contact one another,
ii)
The moments that are side-by-side one another interrelate with one
another.
i)
may also be a sort of relation; so if that were the case, there would merely
be two sorts of relations: a relation of direct abutment or direct contact
(point i) above), and a relation of connection without direct abutment or
direct contact (point ii) above).
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The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 6, 2005
I will argue that moments cannot interact by i) or ii). If I am
correct, this would be a problem for non-Buddhists who espouse rather than
reject i) and/or ii). If the Buddhist espouses i) or ii), I maintain that
the Buddhist holding that causation of moments occurs by i) or ii) is
susceptible to attacks from Western philosophers of time, as discussed in
the previous paragraph. Rejection of i) and ii) is not the rejection of
causation; rather, it is the rejection of causation by contact or relation.
Rather than i) or ii) being the means by which a moment causes another
moment, if i) and ii) lead to contradiction, as I will argue they may, it
would apparently be the case that a sort of Humean causation must be
espoused.
2.2.1 A Humean-Buddhist Account of Time and Causation, and Buddhist
Double Reality
On the Humean account of causation, it is considered significant that the
empirical witnessing of a real connection or contacting
between events never occurs. Rather, there is only the witnessing of events
following one another, where the empirical mind never experiences contact
between moments, or any real relation or connectedness
“stretching” from one moment to the succeeding moment. Hume writes:
“When many uniform instances appear, and the same object is
always followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain the notion of
cause and connexion.” (Enquiry, p. 78)[12]
The empirical mind imagines and fabricates the idea that there is a
non-empirical relation or connection between moments, where the
unobserved relation or connection is distinct from the moments that are
experienced empirically. This is much like the position held by Dharmakīrti:
“…(in reality) the positive entities, by themselves, are unrelated. It is
the imagination (vāsanā) which mixes them (and so they appear as
related)" (Jha, 1990 : 13)
Also, although the empirical mind may imagine or believe that
moments “touch” or contact, there is however no empirical evidence for such
“touching” or contacting, for the following reasons. The empirical mind is
locked in the present: the only experiences it ever has are present
experiences. Memories only occur in the present, and thus are not an example
of the empirical mind possessing evidence of the existence of the past.
According to presentism, the past is merely

[12]
Cited in Pojman, Louis P. 2001. Philosophy: The Quest for
Truth. New York: Oxford University Press. Page 329 |
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moments that no longer exist, but which may be known via present memory,
since they moments that have been replaced by a new present moment. I
imagine that temporal parts theorists[13]
will have an objection to what has just been written. It could be the case
that the empirical mind believes that past times exist (i.e., it believes
that presentism is false), and that states of one’s empirical mind can
thereby exist as past, and thereby witness pastness. But this position would
be a
non-empirical position, since the strictly empirical mind is always
located in a now. For the empirical mind to theorize that it has
temporal parts that exist in the past would be to stray into what is beyond
the empirically knowable. If in each state of its existence the

[13]
Temporal parts theory, which is an opponent theory of presentism, and which
is very widely held in Western analytic metaphysics, can be grasped from a
lucid passage from Hawley:
You're performing an amazing trick right now: you're in two places at once.
How do you manage to be down there, near the floor, and yet also be a metre
or two up in the air? Well, it's not so very amazing: your feet are down
there on the floor, and your head is up in the air. Having spatial parts
enables you to be in several different places, and to have different
properties in different places: you're cold down there on the tiled floor,
and also warm up there by the heater, because your feet are cold and your
head is warm. Moreover, having parts could let you be in the same place as
someone else: if you shared a hand with a conjoined (‘Siamese’) twin, then
you could both wear the same glove without jostling for space…
Things and people take up time as well as taking up space:
you existed yesterday, and, unless reading this article is a real strain,
you will exist tomorrow too. Just as you can have different properties at
different places (hot up here, cold down there), you can have different
properties at different times (yesterday you hadn't heard of temporal parts,
by tomorrow you'll know plenty about them).
Some philosophers believe that you take up time by having
different temporal parts at different times. Your spatial parts are things
like your head, your feet and your nose; your temporal parts are things like
you-yesterday, you-today and you-tomorrow. If you have different temporal
parts, this would explain how you can exist at different times, and it would
also explain how you can have different properties at different times
(you-yesterday hasn't heard of temporal parts, you-tomorrow is an expert).
According to these philosophers, then, persisting through time is pretty
much like extending through space: it's all a matter of parts. (Hawley 2004,
section 1)
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empirical mind only exists in the present and thus only has evidence for the
existence of the present, then it has no evidence that moments before or
after the present exist, and thus has no evidence that there is contacting
or “touching” between moments, or that there are interconnections between
moments. For these reasons, if the empirical mind contains the belief that
there can be contacting or interrelating between moments, it is
non-empirical imagination, rather than empirical observation.
Comparing Humean and Buddhist causation is of course not new. In an article
specifically about the similarities of Humean causation and Buddhist
causation, Jacobson writes:
Both Hume and the Buddha insist that it is wrong-headed to call some
enduring, ever-identical self more real than our changing states. Both
insist that the experiences themselves are spread upon no substance and upon
no substantial self but constitute a process in and for themselves... The
Buddhist position is that there is no self-identical self, only "the
perpetual flux and movement," the abiding flow, but that each of us is "a
numerically new actuality every moment," as Hartshorne (1960 : 298-302) has
put it. Hartshorne presents what he calls "the Buddhist-Whiteheadian
doctrine" as a "radical pluralism" that takes its stand with our "successive
experiences" or "successive actualities," arguing that these are "the
primary units of the plurality" constituted by "the momentary experiences or
selves." (Jacobson, 1969 : 18-19)
For Hume, however,
unlike Leibniz, there can be no thought of events being related to all the
other things of the entire universe… Only the momentary event itself,
co-present with others, is what we perceive. Events contiguous in time
and place, Hume observed, can be and are considered in terms of cause and
effect, but this is chiefly a way of thinking, a manner of speaking, a
cultural habit which leads us to look at one event as cause, the other as
effect, and the bond between them as the "supposititious cause." When
we really analyze our experience, all we find is the momentariness of events
and the cultural habit or "propensity to feign" supposititious causes, which
habit or propensity deadens our sensitivity to
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the sheer momentariness and co-arising
(dependent origination) of the events.
[14]
In a Humean-Buddhist model of causation, ultimate reality does
not involve any connection or contact between moments. Rather, there is only
the witnessing of the moments themselves, following
one-after-the-other.[15]
Causation can be considered a relation or contacting between moments only
from the perspective of the non-nirvanic empirical mind. The empirical
perspective is opposed to the causation of the transcendental (nirvanic),
wherein the durationless present moments themselves are causes.
Buddhist philosophy involves both theories of causation: empirical and
transcendental.
These two positions on causation correspond to the Buddhist
“double reality, the ultimate reality of things by themselves and the
psychologically constructed reality (i.e., unreality) of empirical things.”[16]
The “double reality,” to use Stcherbatsky’s term, is empirical versus
transcendental reality, or unreal versus nirvanic reality: the conceptual
versus the real. Since a double reality is considered in Buddhism,
Stcherbatsky discusses how there are two sorts of causality that need to be
considered. One is what we can call transcendental causality, and the other
empirical causality:
…[T]here are two different realities, a direct one and an indirect one. The
one is ultimate and pure,—that is the reality of the point-instant. The
other is a reality attached to that
[14]
Jacobson 1969, 20. Some have denied that we can compare Humean causation to
Buddhist causation. See Cruise 1983. If my arguments in this article are
correct, it would appear that Cruise’s assertions are incorrect.
Surprisingly, Cruise does not mention Jacobson in Cruise 1983.
[15]
This may also be similar to J-P. Sartre’s positions. In a book where he
compares Sartre to the early Buddhists, Medhibhammaporn writes that Sartre
holds that “[e]ach instant of consciousness is a new existence which does
not arise out of a prior instant.” (Medhidhammaporn 1988, 21.) Sartre writes
that “between two [momentary] consciousnesses there is no cause and effect
relationship… Our consciousness is not the cause of another.” (The
Psychology of Imagination, p. 27, Frechtman trans.)
[16]
Stcherbatsky, F. Th. 1962 (1930). Buddhist Logic. Volume 1. page 143.
Stcherbatsky discusses this in a very interesting passage where he is
comparing Buddhism to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Many have drawn
similarities between some Europeans, such as Hume and Kant, and the Indian
Buddhists.
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point-instant, it is mixed with an image artificially constructed by the
faculty of our productive imagination. That is the reality of the empirical
object. Consequently there are also two different causalities, the ultimate
one and the empirical one. The one is the efficiency of the point-instant,
the other is the efficiency of the empirical object attached to that
point-instant… …[T]here is no separate efficiency, no efficiency in
superaddition to existence, existence itself is nothing but causal
efficiency,… the cause and the thing are different views taken of the same
reality… If we identify reality and causal efficiency, we can say that every
reality is at the same time a cause. If we separate them, we must say that
efficiency is impossible, because it involves us into a proposition which
two contradictorily opposed predicates, since one thing then must exist at
two different times in two different places, i.e. exist and not exist in the
same time and place…
There are thus two causalities, the one real ultimately, the other real
contingently or empirically, just as there are two realities, the
transcendental reality of an instant and the empirical reality of a thing of
limited duration (Stcherbatsky, F. Th. 1962 (1930). Buddhist Logic.
Volume 1. Pages 125-127).
The first sort of causation mentioned above, which is associated with the
empirical life, can be called contingent, conceptual, or
empirical causation, and it involves non-nirvanic imaginary experience
of duration and time, where one static time t1 contacts
and/or is related to another static time t2. Of course
this sort of contact or relation is impossible, since, as Dharmakīrti
writes: “…[H]ow can… the cause and effect relationship (existing in two
things) be possible, because the cause and the effect do not coexist? If it
cannot exist in two how can it be called a relation?” (In Jha 1990, 17). I
discuss many other problems with empirical causation below.
The second sort of causation mentioned above—real, transcendental,
or necessary causation—involves direct awareness of momentary
reality. Real (transcendental) causation is discussed by Stcherbatsky:
[Buddhist causation] is marked by the name of Dependent Origination…
Reality, as ultimate reality, reduces to point-instants of efficiency, and
these point-instants arise…, or
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exist, only so far as they are efficient, that is to say, so far they
themselves are causes. Whatsoever exists is a cause, cause and existence are
synonyms … Just as real existence is only a point-instant, just so a real
cause is only this same point-instant…
Thus the Buddhist theory of Causation is a direct consequence of the theory
of Universal Momentariness. A thing cannot be produced by another thing or
by a personal will, because other things or persons are momentary
existencies. They have no time to produce anything. Not even two moments of
duration are allowed them. Just as there is no real motion, because there is
no duration, just so there can be no real production, because time is needed
for that production… [T]he cause can exist no more when the effect is
produced. The effect follows upon the cause, but it is not produced by it.
It springs up, so to speak, out of nothing,…
[17]
In this article I show that according to the R-theory of time,
which involves a Humean-Buddhist theory of causation, empirical causation
(relations and/or contact between moments) is mental construction
(imagination), and transcendental causation is real. Then I argue that
positions i) and ii) are impossible (relations and contact between moments
are impossible). In 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 I will argue that moments cannot contact
(or “touch”) one another, and in subsections 2.2.3, and 2.25 – 2.2.6 I will
argue that, if contacting is not possible among the point-sized moments,
then moments however also cannot be interconnected to one another in any
way.[18]
2.2.2 The Impossibility of Moments Abutting
I will first consider i), where moments contact one another. On the account
where two moments contact or abut, consider that two moments are
side-by-side one another, one moment being the present, p0, and
the other being the moment before the present, p-1. If p0,
being

[17]
Stcherbatsky, F. Th. 1962 (1930). Buddhist Logic. Volume 1. Pages
119-120. This conclusion, that real causal moments come out of nowhere, or
out of nothing, will be significant when I compare the R-theory of time with
quantum mechanics in the conclusion of this article.
[18]
In Grupp 2005, forthcoming, I also argue that there cannot be any relations
or connections between times.
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a moment, is a location in time,[19]
then any other moment contacting or abutting p0,
such as p-1, which is aside p0, can only also be
located at the present, for the following reasons. Moment p0, the
present, is a location in time. If p0 is a location in time, then
it is not located where, for example, p-1 is, since that would
mean p0 is not identical to itself: p0 would be a
present moment that is located in the past (a present moment that is not the
present). In other words, if p0 and p-1 are distinct
locations in time, then it must be the case that p0 is not where
p-1 is, and p-1 is not where p0 is. But if
p0 and p-1 have any sort of interplay (such as
contacting, attaching or abutting to one another), then they would
apparently have to coincide (fully or partially, depending on the
nature of the moments) for reasons explained next. If p-1
contacts or abuts p0, then p-1, would have to “go
where p0 is” in order to contact or abut p0. p-1,
which is past, must also be present—it would have to be present if it
is to contact or abut p0, if it is to have anything to do with p0.
Also, p0 would be a present that is located in the past, which is
a contradiction.[20]
(An objection to this conclusion will be given in 2.2.3 where I consider
that p-1 and p0 can attach, contact, or abut without
coinciding.)
2.2.3 The Impossibility of Moments Interrelating
I will discuss issues to do with moments contacting one another more in the
next subsection. But before that, in this subsection I will discuss the
other option: instead of contacting, moments that are side-by-side one
another in non-presentist reality might be interconnected or interrelated.

[19]
We can consider it a location since p-1, which is next to p0,
has locatedness since p-1 and p0 can be considered in
the mind in comparison to one another, associated with one another, or if
there were relations and/or contacting between the moments (which I am
currently arguing there cannot be), then the relations will have
mind-independent (realist) relations or contacting between them.
[20]
The conclusions drawn in this paragraph about the contacting or abutting of
moments in a time series come from conversations I had about
Grupp 2003 with
Joshua Upson and Christopher Dillon of Western Michigan University.
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It is often held by philosophers that moments are point-sized
(durationless), and accordingly do not have a (temporal) size.[21]
Without a size it is unclear how moments can contact or abut one another
since they do not have a surface by which to contact any other items. If
that is the case, then if there were any moments that are side-by-side one
another, making up a time-series, then the problem of how they contact is
apparently solved if the moments interrelate in some way. On this
account, p-1 and p0 are interrelated but not abutted
or directly in contact. I will argue for the impossibility of any
sort of relation between p-1 and p0. The impossibility
of relations between distinct items has also been argued by some of the
great Buddhist philosophers, such as Dharmakīrti, who was aware of the
outcomes of some of the issues that will be put forward in this section: “if
two entities are different, how can they be related? And if they are not
different, what is the point of talking about a relation?”[22]
If a relation interconnects moments, such as moments p-1
and p0, it must coincide with the moments it interconnects. To do
this, the relation must make contact with or abut with, the moments it
interrelates, lest it not interrelate the moments.[23]
I will first assume that the relation between moments p-1 and p0
is a simple relation (a relation that does not have any parts). If
the simple relation, in

[21]
St. Augustine allegedly proved that there cannot be individual moments that
have temporal size which goes something like this. If individual moments did
have a temporal since, one half of the moment would not collocate with the
other half, and thus one moment would be past the other, thereby the entire
time atom (chronon), being describable as one thing (since it is an atom),
would be describable at past and not in the past, which appears
contradictory. If there were no temporally extended moments, this might be
another problem that the Buddhist who hold that moments causally “contact”
would have to address, since it appears unclear how there can be contacting
(“touching”) between items that do not have a surface or extension by which
to touch one another. Also see arguments about problems with chronons in
Pyle (1995, 50-59).
[22]
Sambandhaparīksā, Dharmakirti, verse 3. Quoted in Phillips 1995, 331.
[23]
Those concerned with the exemplification tie or instantiation relation that
Western metaphysicians allege to act as an intermediary between the
relations and the moments and thus tying relation to moments, this will be
discussed in section 2.2.5
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interrelating p-1 and p0, contacts or abuts p-1
and contacts or abuts p0, then by its doing so, the relation is
both past and present. This is a contradiction because the relation cannot
have parts that have different characteristics (being past, being future)
since the relation is partless. Since the relation is partless, it is one
entity, and thus the entirety of the relation would be describable by
the self-refuting statement: “Atom (partless object) that is simultaneously
at time p0 and not at time p-1.”
Some may argue that the relation between p-1 and p0
does not have to be simple, and the relation could have parts (it could be a
complex relation). If the relation between p-1 and p0
had parts, it could have a part that only coincides with p-1, and
a part that only coincides with p0, thus avoiding the problems to
do with the simple relation described in the previous paragraph. But this is
of no avail, for the following reasons. If one part of the relation is at p-1,
and the other is at p0, then these parts have to also attach to
one another in order to form a continuous (unbroken) connection of p-1
and p0. But in doing so, the same sort of problems as discussed
above in subsection 2.2.1 about the attaching, abutting, or contacting of
moments p-1 and p0 would ensue in this case with
respect to the parts of the complex relation. If the part of the relation at
p-1, call this part of the relation rpast, directly
contacts or abuts the part of the relation at p0, call this other
part of the relation rpresent, then rpast would have
to be where rpresent is if rpast is to have any sort
of interaction (such as contact, tying, abutment, or attachment) with rpresent.
In other words, rpast would have to “go where rpresent
is” in order to attach to rpresent since rpresent is
only where it is, and to interact with it, the interacting item must be
where rpresent is. If that is the case, however, then, for
example, rpast would be where rpresent is located (in
the present), which is an apparent contradiction, since it would imply that
it is a past item is not past.
2.2.4 Moments Contacting without Coinciding
In this subsection I return to the position discussed in 2.2.1, where it was
assumed that moments that are side-by-side can touch, contact, or abut.
There could be an objection one might draw to the conclusions of 2.2.1
regarding the contacting or abutting of p-1 and p0.
Imagine that contact between moments is not a relation, but is somehow some
sort of non-relational interaction between moments
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(this avoids the problem just discussed in 2.2.2). Also, imagine that it may
be the case that p-1 and p0 contact without
coinciding: p-1 contacts p0, but p-1 and p0
do not coincide in any way, and thus in attaching or contacting p0,
p-1 never becomes present in doing so (this avoids the problem
brought up in 2.2.1). In other words, p-1 and p0
contact one another by attaching or contacting but do not collocate
partially or fully in any way in doing so: p-1 never strays into
p0, and p0 never strays into p-1, and their
interface is one where it is not the case that an item that can only be past
(p-1) is also present, or an item that can only be present (p0)
is also past. (This objection could also be given in a similar way for rpast
and rpresent, where rpast and rpresent are
alleged to contact without coinciding.)
Assuming there can be this sort of contacting, I will proceed to analyze it.
The present appears to be durationless (a time point). Consider a passage
cited in Stcherbatsky and which is attributed to the Buddha himself:
All
(real) forces are instantaneous. (But) how can a thing which has
(absolutely) no duration, (nevertheless have the time) to produce something?
(This is because what we call) “existence” is nothing but efficiency which
is called a “creative cause.”[24]

[24]
This is quoted in Stcherbatsky, F. Th. 1962 (1930). Buddhist Logic.
Volume 1. Page 119.
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2.2.5 The Impossibility of Moments Interrelating by a Timeless Relation
Some may hold, however, that all accounts of the relation between p-1
and p0 given up to this point are inaccurate, and the correct
account of the relation is one where the relation is not located
among the moments, as has been assumed so far. On such an account, the
relation (allegedly) connects the moments but it is not located among
the Buddhist series of replacing present moments, and thus the relation does
not directly attach to, contact, link to, or touch the
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moments it interconnects. (This account is much like the platonist account
of relations discussed in Western metaphysics, where properties and
relations are held to be not located in time.[25])
Rather, the relation is somehow outside of time (outside the replacement of
presents), and not located in the R-time series. This position however does
not escape problems.
It is difficult to understand how a continuous (unbroken) and
uniform integration or linkage[26]
might take place at all between the relation (which is not in time) and the
interrelated moments (which are temporal since they are moments). It appears
that if the relation interrelates moments, then the moments and relation
must somehow continuously and uniformly link and/or integrate. If
there was no such linkage or integration between the relation and the
moments, the relation then would not in fact interrelate the items it is
supposed to interrelate.
If there is such a continuous and uniform linkage or integration
enabling the moments to be connected (tied) to the relation whereby the
relation can interconnect the moments, then the relation that is outside of
time, in touching (linking to, tying to, or integrating with) the moments,
must be in time if it is to make contact with, or abut with, any given
moment. The timeless relation must “go where” the moments are, and thus must
be at places in time if the relation is to

[25]
It is standard in the Western tradition that platonistic relations are those
which are not in the spatiotemporal world, whereas non-platonistic
relations are not outside of the spatiotemporal world, as Loux discusses:
What are the issues
separating the Aristotelian realists from Platonists? … Aristotelians
typically tell us that to endorse Platonic realism is to deny that
properties, kinds, and relations, need to be anchored in the spatiotemporal
world. As they see it, the Platonist’s universals are ontological “free
floaters” with existence conditions that are independent of the concrete
world of space and time. But to adopt this conception of universals,
Aristotelians insist, is to embrace a two-worlds” ontology… On this view, we
have a radical bifurcation of reality, with universals and concrete
particulars occupying separate and unrelated realms… [T]here [is a]
connection between spatiotemporal objects and beings completely outside of
space and time. (Loux 1998, 46)
[26]
“Link” and “nexus” are the words Loux (1998, 38-40) uses to describe how a
relation in fact is attached to the items that are interrelated by it.
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link or integrate with moments in order to do the job of interrelating the
moments. In order to link to or integrate moments, the timeless relation
must become located in time, or must somehow be at a place in time,
if it is to link to or integrate with the moments. But if a timeless
relation is in time, the relation involves contradiction and thus is
impossible.
But perhaps I am using the word “link” incorrectly here. Some may hold that
there is a special nexus, bridge, or tie,[27]
that is not a relation, and which is a distinct intermediary between
the relation and the moments, preventing the relation and moments from
directly attaching. (Such a bridge or tie is typically called the
exemplification tie, or the instantiation relation, in the
contemporary Western tradition.) As mentioned, if the timeless relation is
not located in the R-series, the moments and the relation must be “bridged”,
and thus there is an additional item (a bridging item) between the relation
and the moments that is responsible for the bridging, and which keeps the
relation and moments apart, thus avoiding the problems discussed in the
previous paragraph.
I however find this to involve contradiction, for the following reasons. If
this bridge is partless, in coinciding with the timeless relation, and the
moments, to thereby create a continuous (unbroken) connection between them,
the entirety of the bridge is describable as being in time and not in time,
which appears to be a contradictory description, and thus the bridge cannot
be of this nature. But perhaps the bridge has parts. If so, to give rise to
a continuous connection between the timeless relation and the moments, a
part of the bridge that is in time would have to contact, interface, attach,
abut, or relate to a part of the relation that is not in time. If that is
the case, then if there is a continuous connection of the parts of the
bridge, the parts must coincide partially or fully, which would mean that,
for example, the timeless part would have to be in time, which is
impossible. And if there is contact without coincidence between the parts of
the bridge, then much like when discussing chronons earlier in this section,
the interfacing of the parts of the bridge would be describable as
being entirely in time and entirely not in time.

[27]
I am using the words “nexus”, “bridge” and “tie” because I am following the
account given to us by Loux (1998, 38-40) where he uses these words.
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2.2.6 What About an Exemplification Nexus?
In the last subsection (2.2.5) I discussed how some may attempt to avoid
direct contacting of a relation with moments by introducing the idea of a
special bridge-like intermediary that ties the moments and the relation that
connects the moments. This is what Western analytic metaphysicians have
espoused in response to the work of F. H. Bradley, who showed that there may
be problems in considering a relation (or property) as being directly in
contact with the items that it interrelates. There appear to be significant
problems with introducing such a intermediary tie or bridge between a
timeless relation and moments, but perhaps introducing the tie between
relation and moments, where the relation is located where the moments are,
can avoid the problems to do with interconnecting moments by a timeless
relations, as discussed in the previous subsection.
But on this account, the problems discussed regarding the contacting of, and
the relating of, a relation and the moments the relation relates, would be
transferred to this special intermediary, for reasons I discuss next. If the
relation coincided with the tie, and the tie coincided with the moments, and
if the tie is partless, it would apparently involve contradiction, since it
would be a single item describable as past and not past, much like how we
found when discussing a simple relation relating p-1 and p0.
Moving to a different example, the discussion above about the problems
relating of moments by a timeless relation only involved discussion of
the contact or abutment of a timeless item and a temporal item. With a
special intermediary bridging the timeless relation to the moments, problems
much like those described above regarding timeless relations contacting or
abutting temporal moments would be found to describe the special
intermediary tie. Instead of describing problems to do with the contacting,
abutting, or attaching of a timeless relation and moments, which are
problems to do with a timeless item and a temporal item contacting or
abutting, instead the special intermediary involves these problems: the tie
contacts or abuts the timeless relation, and the moment, and thus if it is
partless, the entirety of it is describable as being in time and not in
time. Other arguments for other positions could be given. No matter what the
nature of the connection or contact is between a timeless and temporal
entity, the arguments above will ensue if there is any connection of a
timeless item and a temporal item, since such a contacting or connecting
will
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always require an abutment of, or contact of, a timeless and a temporal
item, which is apparently impossible for reasons discussed in 2.2.4.[28]
A B-theorist might imagine that the argumentation about the impossibility of
the touching and relating of moments (p-1 and p0) does
not apply to her theory since her B-time does not involve tense (past,
present, future). But the above arguments do apply to the B-theory,
since the above arguments only involved discussion of relations between, or
contact and abutment of, two different moments (p-1
and p0), and since B-time also relies on relations between
different moments (different times), the arguments above apply to the
B-theory also. In other words, the above arguments only involved discussing
apparently fatal problems of relations between different times, and it does
not matter what those times are called; it is only the case, as Dharmakīrti
pointed out, that we if we have different items that are interconnected, we
run into apparently fatal problems with those relations.
2.2.7 Other Problems
If there is a causal relation between moments, in addition to the problems
listed above, it would also be the case that something exists in addition to
the moments: (1) there are moments, and (2) there also are relations between
moments. Apparently the relations and the moments must be distinct from one
another: moments are not identical to relations. This further illustrates
the imaginary nature of non-transcendental causation, since this of course
is a violation of Buddhist philosophy of ultimate reality. Dharmottara
writes: “(In Buddhism), since all things are only moments, the things
cannot have any additional outgrowth. Therefore cooperation must be
understood as one (momentary) result produced by, (i.e. ,succeeding to,
several instantaneous moments).”[29]
(Emphasis added.)
2.3 If Moments Do Not Contact or Connect, there is Only One Moment
It appears that the arguments given in this section about the contacting or
connecting of moments imply that moments cannot

[28]
I discussed these and some other problems with the exemplification nexus in
Grupp
2003,
2004a, and
2005.
[29]
Quoted in Stcherbatsky, F. Th. 1962 (1930). Buddhist Logic. Volume 1.
New York: Dover. p. 129.
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contact one another or relate to one another. It appears that Dharmakīrti’s
position must be espoused: “…in themselves existents are unrelated; it is
imagination that relates them.”[30]
The arguments given to this point in this section appear to show that there
cannot be a time series, and there can only be a present. But some may
object and maintain that there could be a series of distinct moments that
are perceived to exist side-by-side, but which are not connected or
in contact. If this were the case, there may not be just one moment, and
thus not just a present, and the R-theory need not be the correct account of
time. Furthermore, if there is more than just a durationless present, then
one could imagine that there could be an object existing at two moments
giving rise to some sort of persistence. This account however may have
serious problems, for reasons I discuss next.
It is the contact or connections (or some sort of interplay) between
moments that enables the moments to have associations with one another, and
enables the distinct moments to be defined in specific ways, such as being
earlier than (past), later than (future), and now, or
such as being next to, 10 seconds apart, and so on. But if
there is no connection of any sort between distinct moments, nor any contact
between distinct moments, and if one attempted to argue for a philosophy of
time where there are many distinct moments that co-exist but which are not
related to or in contact with one another, then it would be the case that
there are no moments that are earlier than any others, later than any
others, before or after any others. The ways that moments touch (contact,
abut, attach) and/or interrelate are how moments are describable as being
distinct from one another. Without such distinctness, moments cannot be
different. If distinct moments are not before or after, earlier than or
later than, one another, then they all must be present moments: all the
distinct moments apparently must be described as now. But on such an
account there would be multiple non-identical nows that co-exist. A now,
however, cannot be distinct from another now, and a now cannot be at a
temporal distance from itself; but if there are multiple distinct nows, now1
and now2, they would be at a temporal distance from one another,
but also not at a distance from one another, which is apparently a
contradiction. The way out of this problem is to assert that there is only
one moment.

[30]
Sambandhaparīksā, verse 5b.
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2.4 Why Replacing Presents?
One might wonder why there is any need for a replacing present. Since
the particles that compose reality (molecules, atoms, quarks, gluons, etc.)
are perceived by the empirical mind to be constantly in motion, they are
constantly changing, and thus are constantly destroyed, where new particles
replace them. For these reasons, no two consecutive present moments can ever
be alike: due to the constant motion of particles, no two consecutive
moments will have the same particle arrangement or particle state, since
from one moment to the next quantum particles have new positions. (This will
be discussed much more in the next section.) For these reasons, if there is
only one moment that ever exists, as was argued in this section, that moment
cannot stay itself for longer than a durationless instant: the present
moment must go out of existence and be replaced by another present. If a
present p changes to p* (p ≠ p*), then since there is only ever one moment
that exists, then the one moment that first exists, p, must be completely
destroyed, whereby the new present, p*, comes into existence. If there is
only one moment that ever exists, then the only means by which presents can
come and go is by a total of present moments.
The conclusions of this section, if correct, are supportive of the Buddhist
philosophy of time and the R-theory. If my arguments are correct, it appears
to be the case that there cannot be any moments next to (side-by-side) one
another in time. If this is the case, there is apparently no way that a
non-Buddhist philosopher can attack the Buddhists for possibly espousing
theories of time that allow for the persistence and identity of changing
objects over time. Furthermore, since to my knowledge, all non-Buddhist
theories of time involve impossible contacting and/or connections between
moments, or do not involve a replacing present, it appears to be the case
that Buddhist R-theory may be a better alternative than the non-Buddhist
philosophies of time.
3. Change and Identity Over Time
In this section I will discuss how the philosophies of endurantism and
perdurantism have not succeeded in explaining the persistence and identity
of objects that change through time. I will argue that this is because it is
incorrectly assumed by non-Buddhists that change and identity over time must
be described as being devoid
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of momentariness. But in reality momentariness may not be a puzzle or
problem at all—it may be a correct account of reality.
Specifically, the material in this section will take the form of the
following argument:
(1) Endurantism and
perdurantism assume that the doctrine of momentariness is a problem to be
solved.
(2) The science of
quantum particles (observing the activities of quantum particles through
special instrumentation) may support the R-theory.
(3) Logic appears to
support the R-theory.
(4) Endurantists and
perdurantists do not yet have anything that resembles a knock-down argument
against the doctrine of momentariness.
(5) The drive to
solve the problem of change and identity over time is generated by, and
based on, what Loux calls “prephilosophical intuition.”
(6) The information
of science and logic is more trustworthy than the information of
prephilosophical intuition.
(7) The placing of
such importance on prephilosophical intuition may be unwarranted since it
supports persistence, while logic and quantum science appear to support the
R-theory (no persistence).
(8) Therefore, the
R-theory may be a better theory than the non-Buddhist theories that posit
the persistence of objects through time (endurantism and perdurantism),
which appear to be against logic and quantum science.
3.1 Persistence and
Identity of Changing Objects Through Time
The description of any object changing implies it cannot persist:
If an object m changes from state m to state m* it can
only do so if m ceases to exist and m* comes into existence.[31]

[31]
E.J. Lowe (2002 : 23) describes the problems of change and of identity over
time as follows:
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Following Western metaphysicians, I will call this “the problem of
change and identity over time,” which is typically addressed in the
philosophies of endurantism and perdurantism in Western philosophy. The
analysis of the persistence and identity of changing objects through time is
considered a problem by non-Buddhists because, as they often admit,
it leads to momentariness (and thus to the R-theory of time). Nearly all
non-Buddhist philosophers reject the idea that anything like the doctrine of
momentariness is an accurate account of reality, and the reasons they do is
because it is against non-nirvanic, empirical experiences and intuitions
about reality—namely, the intuitions that objects persist through time and
remain themselves through change. The lure of non-nirvanic awareness is
strong enough to blind non-Buddhists from the simplicity and obviousness
that the description of the persistence and identity of changing objects
through time actually leads to the position that reality is momentary.
There has been an enormous amount of work put forth by non-Buddhist
philosophers attempting to show that objects do persist through
change and through time without momentariness arising. In Western
metaphysics, it is in the endurance and perdurance debates
that philosophers attempt to explain persistence, in an attempt to avoid
endorsing that objects have a momentary existence. Non-Buddhist
philosophers, such as Western metaphysicians, do occasionally acknowledge
that change is a process that has not yet been described coherently. But it
is also very often the case that non-Buddhist philosophers assume (or
demand) that the persistence and identity of changing objects through time
are ultimately not problems, due to the belief in, or the alleged
verification of, the persistence of objects presented to the empirical
non-nirvanic observer. For example, consider how the Western philosopher
Michael Loux discusses the philosophies of endurantism and perdurantism as
being alleged escapes from the problems of change and identity over time:
…[W]hat
is it for a thing—whether a material object or a person—to persist through
time? [Western] [m]etaphysicians have given us two different types of
answers to this question.

We regularly say
that things can change over time, meaning thereby that one and the same
thing can be different at different times. But I may seem to be nothing
short of a contradiction to say that a thing can be both the same and
different, that is, both the same and not the same.
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According to one answer, for an object to persist through time is for it to
exist whole and entire at each of several different times. On this view,
temporal persistence is a matter of strict identity: where something
persists through time, a thing existing wholly and completely at one time is
numerically identical with a thing existing wholly and completely at another
time. The other answer to our question denies that what exists wholly and
completely at one time can be literally identical with something existing
wholly and completely at another time. On this view… [one and the same]
thing persists by having different parts—what are called temporal
parts—existing at different times. The first answer to our question is
called endurantism; the second, perdurantism (Loux, 2001 : 321).
I will argue that intuitions about, and demands for, persistence of objects
through time and change (such as those found in the endurantism and/or
perdurantism arguments) may be unsubstantiated, and have not put an
end to the “problem” of the persistence and identity of changing objects
through time (i.e., they have not done away with momentariness). The
Buddhist R-theory of time avoids the problem of persistence, since
the R-theory is free from having to address the question: How there can
be change and identity over time? I will argue in section 3
that this may imply that the R-theory may be a better theory of time than
its competitors in describing reality.
3.2 Science Supports the R-theory
In this section I will argue that science may show that reality is
describable by the doctrine of momentariness. This possibility will be
significant to my reasoning in later subsections of this section. I want to
be clear that I am not claiming that science leads to some sort of
sure and hard evidence for the R-theory of time and the doctrine of
momentariness. Rather, I am only suggesting that when we look at some
of the current findings of science (which of course could be modified or
overturned), it appears that they are more in line with the R-theory than
with the philosophies of persistence. If momentariness is not a
problem, but conversely is the correct account of reality (i.e., if m
changes to m*, then m goes out of existence and m*
comes into existence), the doctrine of momentariness and the R-theory
of time would be a correct account of reality. But this option is typically
not
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taken seriously, or is just ignored, by non-Buddhist philosophers—such as
the contemporary philosophers in the Western tradition. This is because the
doctrine of momentariness and the R-theory of time are in disagreement with
the empirical belief that objects (seem to) persist through time, as is
believed by the non-nirvanic observer engaged in non-nirvanic macroscopic
sense perception and the experience of a specious present.
The Buddhist would appear to be justified if she maintained that, at their
current level of development, and through their long history, neither
endurantism nor perdurantism have evolved to the point where they have
succeeded in explaining time and the identity of objects through change
in a way that surely avoids the doctrine of momentariness. At best,
endurantism and perdurantism can only be described as attempts to do
so. But a Buddhist can merely reply: since endurantism and perdurantism
offer no knock-down argument against the doctrine of momentariness and the
R-theory of time, the Buddhist can instead consider the seemingly
straightforward and simple logical position that if an object m
changes to m* then m must go out of existence and m* must come
into existence.
Moving from Buddhist logic to science, many hold that the doctrine of
momentariness does not disagree with quantum theory (or even the theories of
relativity).[32]
If we consider quantum theory, and if we investigate just how quantum
theorists have found particles at the quantum level to “move” about, this
may provide evidence for the R-theory of time, and for the doctrine of
momentariness. Specifically, when physicists analyze how the particles that
make up reality “move,” they find that particles do so by going out of
existence at one place, and coming into existence at another. This
quantum jumping, as it is often called, may indicate that particles have
a discontinuous existence. Quantum jumping is most typically discussed in
the context of electron orbital jumping (but this is just one of the
possibilities). Consider the following passage from Pine:
The science of the subatomic realm is called
quantum physics or quantum mechanics. The word "quantum" refers to the fact
that energy at the microscopic realm comes in packets, or quanta; energy is
said to be "discrete" rather than continuous. The best way of understanding
the implications of discrete

[32]
See Mortensen 2002, section 5. I will give more examples below.
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motion is to understand the most famous phrase in
this science, the "quantum jump". As we will soon see, this does not refer
to a continuous, quick motion of an object, but rather a discontinuous,
instantaneous movement from one place to another. In other words, quantum
objects seem to be able to move from place to place without being anywhere
in between. They seem to "pop" in and out of existence (Pine, 1998 :
217-18, n.1). (Emphasis added.)
Moving away from discussion only of electrons, and focusing on the motion of
all particles at the quantum domain, consider an interesting passage from
the physicist Nick Herbert:
In the … world of the quantum, a particle can vanish without a trace
(quantum annihilation), or come into existence out of nowhere (quantum
creation), move from location A to location B without being in between
(quantum tunneling), or instantly flip from one state of being to another
(quantum jumping) (Herbert, 1989 : 157).
All quantum measurements when scrutinized at their finest level of
resolution consists of tiny particlelike events called “quanta,” or “quantum
jumps”—flashes of light on a phosphor screen, for instance; or a
bubble, spark, or click in a particle detector; the blackening of a silver
grain in a photographic emulsion; or the sudden excitation of a
light-sensitive molecule in your eye. The world when looked at closely
appears to be made of little dots, much like color photos in a magazine. The
first law of quantum theory is that these quantum jumps occur completely at
random—no theory, quantum or otherwise, can predict where or when the next
light-induced flash will occur in your retina (Herbert, 1989 : 160).
(Emphasis added.)
Herbert’s passage implies that observations of quantum particles are
observations of apparently short-lived or instantaneous, and apparently
stationary, flashes, dots, and smears of quantum energy. It does not appear
that Herbert’s passage suggests that quantum items exist continually,
persisting through a measurable duration, moving about in a familiar
macroscopic-like way, first existing at position x and then enduring through
time so as to travel (move) to y through space and time without being
momentary.
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If physicists are giving an accurate description of quantum reality, I will
explain in a few places below that their research could give evidence for
all of reality being momentary. If it is the case that quantum theories
describe the fundamental level of reality, and if particles are momentary,
and if all of reality is composed of momentary quantum particles, then all
of reality is momentary. The reasoning just given can be put in the
following syllogism:
Macroscopic reality is composed of quantum particles.
Quantum particles obey the doctrine of momentariness.
Therefore, macroscopic reality obeys the doctrine of momentariness.
If this syllogism is not in error, it would indicate that quantum physics
supports the doctrine of momentariness. I will discuss objections to this
syllogism in 3.4.
3.3 Non-Buddhist Philosophy of Time is Based on “Prephilosophic
Intuition”
In this section I will discuss how non-Buddhists typically deny the doctrine
of momentariness by following pre-logical and unscientific intuition
that is not in accord with the guidance of scientific and logical evidence.
I will also find that by asserting that their intuition is to be
trusted, they are, perhaps inadvertently, rejecting basic findings of
logic and science. What I specifically mean by “intuition” can be clarified
if I give passages from Loux and Merricks, who are each widely discussed
Western metaphysicians. These passages also show how endurantism and
perdurantism—the areas of Western metaphysics that consist of attempts to
describe the persistence and identity of changing objects through time in a
way that avoids momentariness—are fields that have been created out
of the intuitions and beliefs about the non-momentariness of
objects found in non-nirvanic psychology.
[Arguments against the endurantist show that] the endurantist is unable to
give a satisfactory account of any case where an object undergoes a change
in one of its accidental, but nonrelational properties. The claim is that an
endurantist account of change requires us to reject a principle that none of
us [i.e., Western metaphysicians] wants to reject, the Indiscernibility of
Identicals… [which] is the claim that necessarily if an object, a,
and an object, b, are numerically
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identical, then every property of a is a property of b and
vice versa… ...[S]ince the one has and the other lacks one and the same
property, we have a violation of the Indiscernibility of Identicals; or so
the perdurantist claims. The perdurantist, however, adds that on a temporal
parts account of persistence, everything falls into place. On that view,
x-at-t and x-at-t’ are numerically different objects, so there is no
violation of the Indiscernibility of Identicals; but x-at-t and x-at-t’ are
temporal parts of one and the same four dimensional whole, x, so we have the
persistence our prephilosophic intuitions call for (Loux, 2001
: 324). (Emphasis added.)
Now consider what Merricks writes about endurantism versus
perdurantism:
Objects persist. Objects last over time. The computer I use today is the
same computer I used yesterday. Some [non-Buddhist] philosophers think
objects last over time by having temporal parts. According to such
philosophers, any three-dimensional thing one sees at one time is not the
same three-dimensional thing one sees at the next; rather, each
three-dimensional thing is a momentarily existing entity… An enduring object
is usually defined as one that is “wholly present” at each time at which it
exists… The endurantist is committed to [the identity of an object if it
changes through time]… Therefore, the critic of endurance claims, endurance
combined with change results in contradiction.
The seriousness of the problem can be seen by noting that it would arise
even if, as a matter of contingent fact, persisting objects did not undergo
change—because it seems that endurance, combined with the indiscernibility
of identicals, makes change of persisting objects impossible. But surely
it is possible that persisting objects change. This is the problem of
indiscernibility and change over time (Merricks, 2001 : 353-354). (Emphasis
added.)
The point of citing these passages is to give examples of the way that
non-Buddhist philosophers commonly reject that change involves momentariness
without presenting any sort of argument or evidence. They are apparently
eager enough to reject momentariness that they appear comfortable in basing
their theorization on intuition and belief, rather than on
philosophy, logic or science. If there is any
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intuition found in science or logic, it is traditionally held to be less
important and less valuable than experimentation (and theory based on
experimentation) in the case of science, and logical evidence in the case of
philosophy. The reason for this is because science and logic have usually
proven to be a much more successful means of describing reality than
intuition is. (I will give examples below.) As shown in the passages above,
Western analytic philosophers often discuss trusting their empirical
intuitions as if there is no need to question our intuitions. In response to
what has just been written, I imagine empirically oriented philosophers may
demand: “But I just see the object right there, enduring through time! How
can that be incorrect?” In 2.2.1 above, I discussed reasons why this cannot
be what the empirically-oriented observer in fact observes. Empirical
consciousness only does its observing in a now (in the present)—and
surely seems to be able to verify that the object is enduring through
time, right there in front of her eyes—but if that is the case then
empirical observation is however only a series of replaced present
empirical states of consciousness, replacing at a rate faster than the
empirical awareness can discern. Thus there is no reason to believe that the
experience of the empirically-oriented philosophers is an experience that
correctly indicates what reality is like.
Despite what many empirically oriented philosophers, many others, such as
many quantum physicists and many non-Western philosophers do not share in
this trust, given the evidence against the reliability of the information of
our intuition, and of our macroscopic sense information. As just mentioned,
Buddhists typically fall under this variety of philosopher, as Dreyfus
discusses, in a passage about Dignāga and Dharmakīrti:
Our ordinary attitude assumes that existence and reality are given to our
intuition and refuses to differentiate between what is more and less real.
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are not satisfied with this attitude, for to give
all phenomena equal ontological status leads to the undesirable
multiplication and reification of entities. Accordingly, one of the
important tasks of the philosopher is to distinguish what to accept as real,
in the full sense of the word, and what to consider as conceptually
constructed (Dreyfus, 1997 : 48).
It may appear safe to many to trust the appearances presented to the
ordinary (empirical, non-nirvanic) consciousness, such as persistence, the
spatial extension of objects, and so on. It may appear
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to some that, yes, science and logic
can occasionally go against our intuitions, but some issues, such as
persistence and spatial extension, are too commonsensical and obvious to
ever be shown to be mere errors of the mind. But even the actuality of such
seemingly ordinary perceptual objects, such as color, surface, distance, and
continuous (non-momentary) motion—items basic to ordinary, empirical,
non-nirvanic, macroscopic perception, and which may appear to be entirely
commonsensical, intuitive, prephilosophical aspects of human understanding
that are beyond question—are in fact drawn into serious question by the
experimental and mathematical findings of physicists[33]
(and the logical findings of Buddhists[34]).
The point

[33]
For a discussion on many of these issues to do with the opposition quantum
physics has with the concepts of space, time, distance, and motion, see
Quentin Smith (2003). Also, consider a passage from Greene, a famous
physicist, on the nature of ultimate reality in physics:
…[R]esearch on aspects of M-theory… has shown that
something known as a zero-brane—possibly the most fundamental
ingredient of M-theory, an object that behaves somewhat like a point
particle at large distances but has drastically different properties at
short ones—may give us a glimpse of the spaceless and timeless realm… [W]hereas
strings show us that conventional notions of space cease to have relevance
below the Planck scale, the zero-branes give essentially the same
conclusion but also provide a tiny window on the new unconventional
framework that takes over. Studies with these branes indicate that ordinary
geometry is replaced by something known as noncommutative geometry…
In this geometrical framework, the conventional notions of space and of
distance between points melt away, leaving us in a vastly different
conceptual landscape. (Greene, 1999, p. 379)
If the quantum level
makes up the macroscopic level, it is difficult to understand how the
macroscpic (empirical) level can emerge out of the quantum level (I will
discuss issues similar to this much more in the next subsection). But that
is only a problem if one trusts the information of their
empirically-oriented senses.
[34]
Stcherbatsky discusses logical implications of the doctrine of
momentariness:
The sensible world consists of sensibilia which are but momentary
flashes of energy. The perdurable, eternal, pervasive Matter which is
imagined as their support or substratum is a fiction of the Sānkyhas and
other schools. All things without exception are nothing but … momentary
events… By proving this our fundamental thesis alone, we
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here to suggest if intuition is not guided by the findings of philosophy and
science, then such intuition may be little more than a means of knowing
reality as it is not. If so, the non-Buddhist endurantists and
perdurantists are basing their claims on non-logical, non-scientific
evidence—or, as Loux puts it, prephilosophical intuition.
Logic appears quite simply to lead to the position that if m changes
to m*, then it can only do so according to the doctrine of
momentariness. But the non-Buddhist does not see matters this way, given
that (non-nirvanic) prephilosophical intuition typically is willing to go
against the logic of the doctrine of momentariness. Consider how David
Lewis, a very well-known Western philosopher, presents his case in an
article against presentism, and thus against momentariness; notice how his
position is only based on belief (intuition), and no argumentation is given:
“[Presentism] rejects endurance... rejects persistence... [and goes] against
what we all believe... No man, unless it be at the moment of his
execution, believes that he has no future; still less does anyone
believe that he has no past” (Lewis 1998 : 206).
(Emphasis added.) It seems that Lewis’s use of the word “belief” is very
similar to the “prephilosophic intuition” described by Loux.
Prephilosophic intuitions are widely known for their capacity to mislead the
intuitions. For example, when I was young child, I had the belief and
intuition that the sun was a ball that literally moved (floated) across the
sky repetitiously day-after-day while the earth remains stationary. Was I
irrational for this? From the perspective of intuition and belief, perhaps
not. My prephilosophical (and pre-scientific) sense information
indicated to me that the sun was floating across the sky. Only later
did I find out that my intuitions about my immediate sense information were
entirely incorrect and it was just the opposite that was the case: the sun
is (more-or-less) stationary

could have
repudiated at one single stroke… the God (of the theists), the eternal
Matter (of the Sānkyhas) and all the wealth of (metaphysical) entities
imagined by our opponents. To examine them one by one, and to compose
elaborate refutation at great length was a perfectly useless trouble, since
the same could have been done quite easily.. Indeed, not one of our
opponents will admit that these entities are instantaneous, that they
disappear as soon as they appear, that their essence is to disappear without
leaving any trace behind. (Stcherbatsky Vol. 1, 1962 (1930), 79-80.)
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with respect being at the center of the solar system, and the earth is
moving around it.
This example can perhaps serve as an analogy to what might be behind most or
all prephilosophic intuitions. What I am suggesting is that it could be the
case that our prephilosophic intuition is in general incorrect. Consider the
following argument, which makes use of the syllogism about quantum reality
that I presented in 3.2:
1.
Prephilosophic intuition
is in line with non-nirvanic psychology.
2.
Non-nirvanic psychology
is unaware of momentariness.
3.
Quantum reality
apparently shows that reality is momentary.
4.
Logic (and Buddhist
logic) apparently shows that if there is change, then reality is momentary
5.
Prephilosophic intuition
is in contradiction to quantum theory and to logic.
Conclusion: Therefore, prephilosophic intuition is an incorrect
account of reality since it is unaware of the momentary nature of reality.
Regardless of what the non-nirvanic psyche believes reality to be like, if
the argument just given is correct, then reality is not describable by our
prephilosophic intuitions.
The non-nirvanic psyche gives much credit to its macroscopic worldview,
despite that fact that simple science and logic show that view to be in
error. It is interesting to note that Western metaphysicians, despite not
being able to describe change or identity through time, nevertheless
typically assert that there is identity through time, and changing
objects do in fact perdure or endure. A passage from Loux appears to
clearly reveal the unabashed bias that the non-nirvanic psychology has
toward prephilosophic intuition:
Except for the occasional sceptic, we all believe that things persist
through time. We think that the familiar objects and persons with which
we interact on a regular basis persist from day to day. I believe
that the chair on which I am sitting is the same chair on which I say
yesterday and that the man who brings me today’s mail is the same person who
delivered yesterday’s mail; and I believe that the same is true of
myself. Indeed, it almost seems misleading to say that I believe that
I
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persist through time. The claim strikes us as too guarded; it seems to
suggest that I might be in some doubt about my persistence through time. The
fact is, however, that the proposition that I—this very person—existed
yesterday and the day before that and the day before that is about as
certain to me as any proposition (Loux, 2001 : 321). (Emphasis added.)
Although
somewhat rarely, Western philosophers do occasionally release their grip on
the endurantism and perdurantism debate and bring up the doctrine of
momentariness (though they typically do not use the phrase “doctrine of
momentariness”) as a possible way to explain time and change. But,
unsurprisingly, Western metaphysicians also typically discuss the doctrine
of momentariness in order to merely reject it without any arguments as to
why they reject it, relying only on an appeal to prephilosophic intuition
about objects. For example, consider how E.J. Lowe, a widely discussed
Western metaphysician, analyzes the doctrine of momentariness (he calls it
“intermittent existence”):
A further question which
[my] discussion [of change and identity over time] provokes is whether it is
possible for a composite thing, such as a ship, to enjoy an intermittent
or interrupted existence. In an ordinary case of disassembly and
later reassembly—as when a tent is taken down and later erected again, or a
watch it taken to pieces for cleaning and later put back together again—it
seems that we have two options when asked what happens to the composite
object concerned. We could say that it goes on existing in a disassembled
state, or we could say that it temporarily ceases to exist until it is
reassembled (Lowe, 2002 : 33).
Lowe raises the
issue of “interrupted existence,” but then in the next lines, and resorting
to prephilosophic intuition, he does not endorse the theory of interrupted
existence. Rather, in trusting his prephilosophic intuition (i.e., by
trusting non-nirvanic psychology), Lowe gives an unargued opinion
which is intended to bring the reader against the doctrine of momentariness
and to the non-logical, non-scientific assumption of a non-momentary
reality:
I think it improbable
that we should, in fact, never have need to speak in this way [to speak of
objects as having what he calls intermittent existence]. So my tentative
verdict is that no
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composite object whatever
enjoys a merely intermittent existence—but I concede that my opinion
in this matter is controversial (Lowe, 2002 : 34). (Emphasis added.)
Lowe refers
to his conclusion as a “tentative verdict”, but the word “verdict” implies
that there is evidence that brings one to a decision on an issue, as
in a court case. But there is no evidence presented here by Lowe. In the
end, what it appears Lowe has done is raise the issue of “intermittent
existence” and then assert (if I may paraphrase): “I don’t think we have to
endorse intermittent existence; case closed.” This however is not a verdict,
but an opinion devoid of reasonable evidence—perhaps on the level of what
Wittgenstein referred to as religion: to argue without evidence or
argumentation.
Some
Western philosophers have more seriously entertained the idea of an R-theory
of time. Consider a passage by Jubien, where he entertains the idea that
time involves the momentariness of, and the replacing of, images in
one’s mind due to the momentariness of reality:
[S]uppose R is a region
of space that is fully occupied by stuff at the instant t and also at
the instant t*, later than t. Do we automatically have two
entities [or two blobs of stuff] in such a case? Many philosophers hold that
the answer is no, claiming that “stuff can persist through time”... But
others claim the opposite. On the former view, time is like a river that is
flowing past objects, which the result that the same object exists at
different times. On the latter view, the passage of time is better
represented by a movie, with the images on the screen playing the role of
physical objects in the world. In a movie, new images keep appearing and
replacing others, which then cease to exist. This is true even in a film
of totally motionless and unchanging objects. So on this view, the stuff
that comprises the universe is continuously being replaced by brand
new stuff, sometimes indistinguishable from the stuff it replaces (Jubien,
1997 : 157). (Emphasis mine.)
Although Jubien writes as
if the doctrine of momentariness is one of the theories espoused by Western
philosophers of time, to my knowledge, an R-theory of time with a replacing
present has never been a major position in Western philosophy or in any
non-Buddhist philosophy of time (except perhaps for the ancient Greek
Cyrenaics, as mentioned in endnote 5, but which have been largely forgotten
in
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the Western tradition). It is the Indian Buddhists who have long endorsed
the logic of momentariness, and for that reason the R-theory should be
considered the Buddhist theory of time.
For reasons discussed in this subsection, it appears one may be able to
discard the information about the non-momentariness of reality presented by
the prephilosophic intuition, since it may be the case that logic and
science support the R-theory of time and the doctrine of momentariness.
3.4 Objections to the Syllogism: Anti-Reductionism
Some may object to the syllogism given in 3.2. In this section I
will discuss two objections to it.
Some may assert that the syllogism appears to arrive at a reductionistic
conclusion. Reductionism can be defined as: object x can be shown to
consist of nothing but more fundamental objects that make up x.
It is not my goal to take a side in the reductionism versus
anti-reductionism debate. It is debatable whether or not the syllogism is in
fact reductionistic, but in this subsection I will argue that it does not
matter if the syllogism is reductionist or not. This is because regardless
of whether or not reductionism or anti-reductionism is correct, in either
case the syllogism appears to be successful: even if macroscopic reality is
not reducible to quantum reality, quantum reality’s apparent momentariness
nevertheless indicates that macroscopic reality must be momentary. If that
is the case, then whether reductionism, or anti-reductionism is correct, it
appears that in both cases the syllogism does involve an inference from the
premises to the conclusion.
If reductionism is a correct philosophy, it is obvious that it does not harm
the syllogism. So what needs to be discussed is whether the syllogism is
successful if reductionism is incorrect, and where any micro- or
macroscopic composite object, or all of reality, need not only be
described in terms of their quantum parts. I will argue that if
anti-reductionism is the correct account, macroscopic objects can apparently
only be momentary on either account, and thus the syllogism is vindicated.
If anti-reductionism is correct, no macroscopic item can be explained only
in terms of its quantum particles: macroscopic reality is non-momentary,
even though it is composed of momentary
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quantum particles. Consider a lion, L1,
where L1 is not reducible to its constitutive momentary quantum
particles. The anti-reductionist holds that L1 is emergent on[35]
a constitutive momentary quantum particle assemblage, q1, at
moment t1, but L1 is not reducible to q1.
If it were the case that quantum reality consists of momentary particles,
then from moments t1 to t2, the constitutive momentary
quantum particle assemblage q1 is replaced by a new constitutive
momentary quantum particle assemblage, q2, at t2. This
indicates that L1, which is emergent on q1, may not
exist at moment t2, since the constitutive momentary quantum
particle assemblage q1 does not exist at t2 and has
been replaced by q2. If q2 composes L2, but
not L1, then regardless of whether or not L1 and L2
are fully explainable in terms of their constitutive momentary quantum
particle assemblages, since L1 and L2 are partially
explainable in terms of their constitutive momentary particles, then from t1
to t2 the particle bases are different, and L1 and L2
are describable as being different in at least that one respect. If they are
partially different (i.e., if at least one aspect of L1 does not
persist into L2), then they are not identical, and L1
cannot be the same as L2 (L1 and L2 are
momentary). If L1 and L2 are not identical, it is
because their constitutive momentary quantum particle assemblages have been
replaced, and thus the syllogism from subsection 3.2 appears sound.
Regardless of whether L1 is or is not reducible to its
constitutive momentary quantum particle assemblage, if the constitutive
momentary quantum particle assemblage is replaced at t2, then it
appears that L1
would have to be replaced by L2.

[35]
“Emergentism” is a word typically associated with the
reductionism/anti-reductionism debate. Stephan writes:
The different varieties of emergentism are covered more or less by three
theories deserving particular interest: synchronic emergentism,
diachronic emergentism, and a weak version of emergentism. For
synchronic emergentism the relationship between a system‘s property and the
system‘s microstructure, i.e., the arrangement and the properties of
the system‘s parts, is in the center of interest. For such a theory, a
property of a system is taken to be emergent only if it is irreducible
or, what I take to be the same, if it is not reductively
explainable. (2002, 78)
In this case, the
properties solidity, being a lion, golden, being
non-momentary, being a mereological whole, are those which
compose L1 and which are emergent on q1.
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The motion, and the apparent momentariness, of quantum particles makes
macroscopic reality momentary, even if anti-reductionism is correct.
Some may object to the reasoning given in the previous paragraph for this
reason: it does not matter what the constitutive momentary quantum particle
assemblages (q1 and q2) are doing, because L1,
in being emergent on q1, can be treated as distinct from,
separate from, q1, and if L1 is distinct from q1,
it is not clear why L1 must be replaced if q1 is
replaced. In other words, why can’t the replaced constitutive momentary
quantum particle assemblage (q2), and the first constitutive
momentary quantum particle assemblage (q1), both give rise
to L1, whereby L1 would persist from t1 to
t2, even though L1 consists of distinct quantum
particles from t1 to t2? On this account, the
anti-reductionist could assert that the constitutive momentary quantum
particle assemblages that compose L1, described by discontinuous
quantum jumping and momentariness, do not change the fact that we can see
with our non-nirvanic sense perception that L1 persists from t1
to t2, and such sense experience is enough to ascertain that L1
stays itself from t1 to t2, regardless of whether or
not the constitutive momentary quantum particle assemblages making up L1
are momentary.
There appears however to be a few problems with this account. Firstly, our
ordinary non-nirvanic understanding of reality does not indicate that L1
is unchanging from any one moment to the next, but rather it indicates that
L1 is changing from any one moment to the following moment. This
is because there will always be an aspect of the lion (the lion as emergent
upon the quantum particles) that is not the same from one moment to the
next. For example, the organization of mental states going through the
lion’s mind and/or brain are likely fast-paced as, for example, it scans a
landscape and images are replaced at an extremely fast rate, and thus it is
hard to imagine that the lion’s mind is ever identical from one moment to
the next. As another example, consider the flow of blood through the lion’s
body; it is hard to imagine, since it is productively flowing every second
of the lion’s life, that there are ever two instants where the blood is in
the same state from one instant to the next—how can there be a perpetual
flow of something (of blood) that is not perpetually moving and thus
perpetually changing? Other examples are easy to find. The heartbeat of the
lion is continual change. On a breezy day, the fur of
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the lion may be perpetually moving in the wind. As a lion walks, or
performs any bodily action, such as moving a limb, the lion is not the same
from any one moment to the next, since such motions are continuous motions,
meaning the limb or body-part in question is always in a different position
from one durationless instant to the next. For reasons just given, it is
hard to imagine how or why one could assume that the emergent lion, L1,
is ever an unchanging entity from one moment to the next, or the same item
from one moment to the next.
Secondly, in section 2 of this article I found that moments apparently
cannot contact or interconnect in any way. If my argumentation is correct,
then it seems that since there is a discontinuity and an unconnectedness
between q1 and q2, then even if it is asserted that L1
is emergent upon both q1 and q2, there also
must be a unconnectedness and/or discontinuity between L1 at t1
and t2. Therefore, even if one asserts that L1, which
is emergent on q1, is identical to L1, which is
emergent on q2, it appears that there is an unconnectedness
and/or discontinuity between L1 at t1 and L1
at t2. But if there is an unconnectedness and/or discontinuity
between L1 at t1 and L1 at t2,
then for reasons I will discuss next, it appears that the following equation
must be true:
L1 at t1 ≠ L1 at t2.
If L1 at t1 is emergent on q1, then L1
at t1 is describable by the statement,
“is emergent on q1.”
If L1 at t2 is emergent on q2, then L1
at t2 is describable by the statement,
“is emergent on q2.”
The first statement is different from the second,
“is emergent on q1” ≠ “is emergent on q2.”
But if these statements that describe L1 differ, then the
descriptions of the L1s differ. And for that reason, L1
at t1 ≠ L1 at t2, and lion L1
must be momentary if the constitutive quantum particles composing the lion
replace from t1 to t2.
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On a similar note, one might assert that the first statement of the
syllogism at the end of 3.2 (“Macroscopic reality is composed of quantum
particles”) involves the following composition fallacy: the parts
(quantum particles) of the macroscopic object (such as a lion) have the
attribute of momentariness, but it is incorrect to maintain that the
whole (lion) has the attribute of momentariness. Stated differently, a
composition fallacy would be committed if the parts of an object have some
property I (I=impermanence), but it would not follow that the whole also has
property I. This objection is similar to the anti-reductionist objection
discussed above. Above I found that even if anti-reductionism is correct, it
appears to be the case that a momentary quantum particle assemblage cannot
give rise to a non-momentary object composed of the momentary quantum
particles lion. If my reasoning is correct, then property I is ascribable to
both whole and parts—to both particles and lion.
3.5 Conclusion
In this section I have found that endurantism and perdurantism are based on
intuitions and beliefs, and are not based on scientific evidence, nor on the
evidence of logic. I maintain that intuition and belief do not present the
evidence needed to assert that the momentariness of the R-theory is
incorrect, nor that the non-Buddhist philosophies of time are more robust
than the R-theory of time. Conversely, the problem of persistence appears to
be a problem not only because is it against the simple logic of
momentariness (if any object changes it cannot stay identical to itself
through change), but because persistence may not be supported by quantum
science. If my reasoning in this section is correct, the R-theory of time
appears to be a better alternative than the non-Buddhist philosophies of
time, such as endurantism and perdurantism, since the non-Buddhist
philosophies of time typically involve the non-logical and pre-scientific
belief that there is persistence of objects and selves through a
duration.
4. Metaphysical Realist Objections
Some might wonder why an entire object must go out of existence when
it changes. For example, and from the perspective of the empirical mind,
when a lion changes by losing one hair of its mane, why is it the case that
the entire lion goes out of existence at t1 whereby a copy of an
entire new lion comes into being at t2? Why can’t, for example,
just one or a few properties of the lion alter or just
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one or a few pieces of the lion alter, where the rest of the object
persists, and accordingly the entire lion does not vanish out of
existence? These questions were addressed above when I discussed how the
lion is composed of quantum particles: it is an illusion that, for example,
when the lion loses a single hair, only that aspect of the lion changes, and
the legs, tail, and abdomen of the lion remain unchanged, since in reality
all of the lion is composed of particles in motion (moving according to
quantum jumpiness), and thus all fundamental particles making up the lion
are momentary, regardless of what the macroscopically oriented empirical
mind believes to be the case about reality.
While it seems this does answer the question of why the entire object
replaces, I will however ignore this reasoning, which is based on quantum
theory, in order to discuss how Western metaphysicians have attempted to
explain objects as persisting through time, where only a few pieces and/or
properties of an object (such as a lion) are momentary, rather than it being
the case that the entirety of the object in question is momentary. I will
show, however, that the Western accounts of the (alleged) persistence of
changing objects apparently cannot be an account of how objects
change without resorting to the R-theory of time. The issues brought up in
this section have to do with the Western account of
metaphysical realism,[36]
which is very similar to the Nyāya
account of realism.[37]

[36] In
the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press,
1995, pp. 562-63), Butchvarov describes what is meant by “metaphysical
realism”:
Metaphysical
realism, in the widest sense, [is] the view that (a) there are real objects
(usually the view is concerned with spatiotemporal objects), (b) they exist
independently of our experience or our knowledge of them, and (c) they have
properties that enter into relations independently of the concepts which we
understand them or of the language with which we describe them.
Anti-realism is any view that rejects one or more of these theses,
though if (a) is rejected the rejection of (b) and (c) follows trivially…
In
discussion of universals [properties], metaphysical realism is the view that
there are universals…
[37]
See Dreyfus (1997, 53-58, esp. p. 57). This passages shows how closely
aligned Western metaphysical realism is aligned with the realism of the
Nyāya.
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Consider the lion changing through time when it loses a single hair. For
simplicity, consider that lion L is describable in terms of three
properties, S, B, H, but L changes to L*, where L* is describable in terms
of S, B, M, rather than S, B, H:
L = [S, B, H]
L* = [S, B, M],
L’s properties are S=sleeping, B=breathing, H=has hair h1, and
L*’s properties are S=sleeping, B=breathing, M=missing hair h1.
On this account, S and B seem to have persisted, but M replaces H. L ≠ L*
since [S, B, H] ≠ [S, B, M]. But since S and B may have persisted, why then
do we need to hold that all of L vanishes? Shouldn’t it be the case
that just H vanishes? If that were the case, then one might attempt to hold
that L ≠ L* is not correct, since not all of L has vanished. But one might
assert that instead of L ≠ L*, according to this objection, the correct
account would be:
When m changes to L*, some of L vanishes, and some of L endures to L*.
Making use of the approximately equal sign, one might put the matter
this way:
L ≈ L*
According to this objection, rather than holding that L ≠ L*, one should
espouse that L is partly equal to L* since S and B do not vanish out of
existence, and it is only H that is momentary.
This objection may be similar to one that Western metaphysical realists have
in mind. On one popular metaphysical realist account, it is held that
objects, such as a lion, have properties, where two items are being
considered: (i) the item that has properties, and (ii) the properties
that are possessed by that item. Hereafter I will call the property
possessor the bare particular. On the Western metaphysical realist
account, the properties and the bare particular are all typically considered
in a realist context (they are not idealist entities since they are assumed
to be separate from the mind), and the
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bare particular—the property possessor—is typically considered distinct from
the properties.[38]
On this account, the properties may come and go, but the thing in itself,
the bare particular, the holder of the properties, apparently

[38]
In this section I am going to attack the Western bare particular theorist’s
account of a persisting bare property possessor. But this might lead some to
wonder if there is another alternative offered in the West, in addition to
realist bare particular theory. There in fact is a second position—the
philosophy of thick particulars, where property possessors are not bare:
On the non-bundle substance [i.e., thick
particular] account, since… there must be two distinct items involved in
property possession (a property tied to a particular that is
entirely distinct from the property), there must be a specific entity that
the… tie is… attachment with… I consider this a rather simple inquiry to
make, for one reason: any of the first-order… properties of a
non-bundled substance must attach to some entity, but if they
attached to each other, the substance would be a bundle, thus first-order
properties must attach to a non-property. (This issue, which is integral
in my theorization in this article, has been ignored by metaphysical
realists.) If a substance is not a bundle, there must be something about the
non-bundle substance that is not a property, and it is that
“something” that the first order properties attach to (via the
exemplification tie).
Many metaphysicians who are non-bundle substance
theorists tell us that non-bundle substances do not involve a bare
particular. They tell us that we “cannot get below the concept of a concrete
particular”… On the Armstrongian [i.e., thick particular] account of
non-bundle substances, some Aristotelian accounts of non-bundle substances,
and platonistic accounts of non-bundle substances, properties are widely
held to be properties of thick particulars,… as when we say: “the
lion (thick particular) is sublime (property)”,… since “lion” may appear to
refer to a complex of properties, and not just to the non-property entity
that properties tie to. (Grupp
forthcoming-a, section 2.3.)
I
only discuss this account in this endnote, rather than in the main text,
since it seems, to my knowledge, that the bare particular position is
discussed much more often in philosophy in general than the thick particular
model, and the thick particular model is only discussed by very specialized
analytic metaphysicians. Also, I feel that the argumentation give in the
passage from my forthcoming paper shows that the philosophy of thick
particulars is not as clear as the perhaps more straightforward bare
particular account.
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need not alter at all. If this were the case, metaphysicians in the Western
tradition could assert that it is not the entirety of a changing object that
vanishes out of existence, but rather just one or some number of properties
of the object that go out of existence. For these reasons, some
metaphysicians in the Western tradition may believe that the problems of
change and of identity over time are avoided by holding that only the
properties tied to the bare particular come and go, but the bare
particular, which is distinct from the properties, can remain changeless.
Oaklander, in discussing the possibility of this position, puts it as
follows:
It sounds paradoxical when you say “Change involves the tomato being what it
is and being what it is not,” but the air of paradox disappears once we
distinguish the thing or substance, the tomato, from its properties. If a
thing changes, then obviously it is not qualitatively identical with what it
was because it has different properties or qualities from those it
previously had. But even through it is qualitatively different it may still
be numerically the same thing that undergoes change (Oaklander, 1995 : 58).
On the Western bare particular
account, properties are not tied to one another, but rather are tied to
an entity that is a non-property. The non-property item is the bare
particular that properties tie to. It has also been called a thin
particular, or an internally bare particular.[39]
Armstrong discusses what is meant by “internally bare particular”, or “thin
particular”:
Here is a problem that has been raised by John
Quilter (1985). He calls it the “Antinomy of Bare Particulars.” Suppose that
particular a instantiates property F. a is F… a and F
are different entities, one being a particular, the other a universal. The
‘is’ we are dealing with is the ‘is’ of instantiation—of the

[39]
If the properties of the non-bundle substance were not tied to a
non-property that is a hold of properties (a bare particular), then they
would be tied to a property, and the substance would be what realists in the
West call a bundle. So on the non-bundle account, the properties must
be held by a non-property. I do not discuss position in this article due to
length considerations. Also, the bundle theory is already under attack by
many Western analytic metaphysicians regarding its not being able to account
for persistence. There are other problems with the Bundle theory as well.
(See
Grupp 2004b.)
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fundamental tie between particular and property.
But if the ‘is’ is not the ‘is’ of identity, then it appears that a
considered in itself is really a bare particular lacking any properties. But
in that case a has not got the property F. The property F remains
outside a… (Armstrong, 2001 : 78-79)
Maintaining that any physical thing is a substance
that involves an enduring or perduring particular does not avoid the
R-theory and the doctrine of momentariness, however, since the bare
particular cannot be an unchanging (and non-momentary) entity, for reasons I
discuss next.
Properties are held to the bare particular
by special ties, often referred to as exemplification ties.
Consider a simple case of change, where a bare particular is tied to a
property H at some moment, and then not be tied to that property at some
following moment (such as when the lion loses a single hair of its mane),
whereby the substance (lion) changes. In other words, at moment m1,
the bare particular is described as “tied to property H”, and at some later
moment m2 the bare particular is described as “not tied to
property H”.[40]
This is a description of the bare particular changing, since the bare
particular can be described with two distinct statements at different
moments.
(Many metaphysical realists hold that properties of
the non-bundle substance are not tied to a bare non-property
(internal bare particular or thin particular), but rather are tied to what
they call a “thick particular,” which is itself a substance, not a bare
(propertyless) item. The same sort of arguments as I have given above would
also hold for the thick particular, since if it has properties that alter,
it changes, much in the same way a bare particular does.)[41]
The metaphysical realist may give the following reply. To
discuss the bare particular as being momentary is to discuss that it
changes. Change, however, is describable in terms of properties, and if,
as some metaphysicians hold, the bare particular is propertyless

[40]
The property “not tied to property h” can be
rewritten as the property “hair has been lost” for any philosophers who are
uncomfortable with the “not” at the front of the statement “not tied to
property h”.
[41]
There are other problems with the Western account of the philosophy of
property possession, and the philosophy of bare particulars. See Grupp
forthcoming-a.
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(internally
propertyless[42]),
then this internal nature is itself a propertyless item. If this is the
case, then the internal nature cannot change since change (and
momentariness) is describable in terms of properties. In other words, the
reasoning of the previous section may appear to have problems since it
discusses bare particulars as changing, but bare particulars cannot since a
propertyless item has no reason for alteration of any sort. So the tying of
the bare particular to the property via the exemplification tie cannot in
fact show that there is a momentary bare particular, as indicated in the
previous section. Instead it seems that the bare particular is not
momentary, and rather only the exemplification ties and properties are.[43]
The metaphysical realist holds that properties that are tied to the bare
particular can alter. “Tying” denotes what the
exemplification tie does with the bare particulars. But
if the exemplification of properties
alters, then the exemplification of properties of the bare particular at t1
is not the same as that at t2. If the

[42]
Moreland, a major contemporary Western bare particular theorist, discusses
the propertyless nature of the bare particular:
Advocates of bare particulars distinguish two different senses of being
‘bare’ along with two different ways something can have a property. In one
sense, an entity is bare if and only if it has no properties in any sense.
There is another sense of ‘bare’, however, that is true of bare particulars.
To understand this, consider the way a classic Aristotelian substance has a
property, say, some dog Fido’s being brown. On this view, [unlike a bare
particular,] Fido is a substance constituted by an essence which contains a
diversity of capacities internal to the being of Fido. These
capacities are potentialities to exemplify properties or to have parts that
exemplify properties… When a substance has a property, that property is
‘seated within’ and, thus, an expression of the ‘inner nature’ of the
substance itself…
By contrast, bare particulars are simple and properties are linked or tied
to them. This tie is asymmetrical in that some bare particular x has a
property F and F is had by x. A bare particular is called ‘bare’, not
because it comes without properties, but in order to distinguish it from
other particulars like substances and to distinguish the way it has a
property (F is tie to x) from the way, say, a substance has a
property (F is rooted within x). Because bare particulars are
simples, there is no internal differentiation within one of them. (Moreland,
2003, 3-4.)
[43]
I am grateful to Jessica Deal of Grand Valley State University for posing
this objection.
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tie of properties alters, then the interplay between bare particular with
the tying of properties also alters. So it seems that the
metaphysical realist must assert that the bare particular is changing since
it has different “interactions” with different exemplification ties at
different times, and if the interaction that the bare particular has
changes, then the bare particular changes. It seems that the metaphysical
realist would likely assert that this cannot happen since it makes no sense
to say the propertyless bare particular changes, since being devoid of
properties and parts, the bare particular cannot be describable as changing,
and thus as being momentary. However, if property exemplification is not
identical from one moment to the next, the bare particular cannot be
described as being the same from one moment to the next, and thus it must be
momentary.
5.
Conclusion
5.1 Conclusion Part 1: Buddhist Atomism (Abstract Atomism)
One
might wonder: Why do presents have to replace? In other words, why is
there any motion at all? Motion leads to the constant change and replacing
of present moments, but what is the reason that replacing occurs? In
this last part of this article, I will discuss why there is motion:
why Buddhist ultimate reality can only be composed of atoms that are
in motion—i.e., why Buddhist ultimate reality is composed of replacing
basic building blocks (Buddhist atoms). I will attempt to give an answer to
why there is motion (replacing), and I will argue that it is a mere outcome
of the nature of Buddhist atomism that there is replacement involving the
atoms that compose ultimate reality.
Buddhist atoms are non-concrete atoms of energy. I also call them
abstract atoms, where the word “abstract” is meant to give emphasis to
the abstruse, perhaps even immaterial or non-concrete nature of the ultimate
“stuff” (atoms) that makes of reality. Buddhism is also often considered to
be atomistic (especially in Indian Buddhism). In discussing Buddhist
atomism, Stcherbatsky writes:
...[T]he Buddhists denied the existence of
substantial matter altogether. Movement consists for them of moments, it is
a staccato movement, momentary flashes of a stream of energy... "Everything
is evanescent",[44]
says the Buddhist, because there is no stuff... Both systems
[Sānkhya, and later

[44]
Nyāya-sūtra, IV. 1. 24 ff.
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Indian Buddhism] share in common a tendency to
push the analysis of Existence up to its minutest, last elements which are
imagined as absolute qualities, or things possessing only one unique
quality. They are called “qualities” (guna-dharma) in both systems in
the sense of absolute qualities, a kind of atomic, or intra-atomic, energies
of which the empirical things are composed. Both systems, therefore, agree
in denying the objective reality of the categories of Substance and
Quality,… and of the relation of Inference uniting them. There is in Sānkhya
philosophy no separate existence of qualities. What we call quality is but a
particular manifestation of a subtle entity. To every new unit of quality
corresponds a subtle quantum of matter which is called guna
“quality”, but represents a subtle substantive entity. The same applies to
early Buddhism where all qualities are substantive… or, more precisely,
dynamic entities, although they are also called dharmas “qualities” (Stcherbatsky
1962 (1930). Vol. 1. P. 19).
In other publications, and with novel arguments, I have argued
that reality is composed of unconnected, unattached, indistinguishable,
non-contacting, non-touching and non-interacting,[45]

[45]
It is interesting to note the way today’s most progressive quantum
physicists also come to the conclusion that the fundamental particles (some
of which, such as electrons or quarks, may be true philosophic atoms)
apparently do not contact, touch or interact in any sort of macroscopic
manner, such as by bouncing off one another, or such as by surfaces
interacting in some way. Instead, and as discussed in subsection 3.2 above,
what “interaction” means in quantum physics is really a misleading word that
physics use, because “interaction” or “touching” or “contacting” of
particles at the quantum level are words that appear to all be synonymous
with the word “momentariness”. Consider this passage from the physicist
Kane:
Nearly all
particles are unstable and decay into others. The word decay has a technical
meaning in physics—one particle disappears, typically turning into two or
three others. A major difference between the way decay is used in physics
and its use in everyday life or biology is that the particles that
characterize the final state are not in any sense already in the decaying
particle. The initial particle really disappears, and the final particles
appear. The photons that make up the light we see provide
an example: The photons emitted from a light bulb when it is turned on are
not particles that were in the bulb just waiting to
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unrelated,[46]
point-sized, basic building blocks: true philosophic atoms: irreducible,
uncuttable, partless.[47]
These articles contribute to showing that (1) realist theories of reality
and property possession[48]
fail; (2) the structure of the world, as given to the non-nirvanic mind,
is a conceptual creation (of the empirical non-nirvanic mind); and (3)
reality is composed of the sorts of non-concrete true philosophic atoms just
mentioned.[49]

come out, and
photons that enter our eyes… are absorbed by the molecules in our eyes and
disappear. All particles can be created or absorbed in interactions with
other particles. (2000, 19)
[46]
I argue this is Grupp
forthcoming-c, and in other places. I do this by applying many
similar arguments against temporal relations that I have presented in
section 2 of this article, but in Grupp forthcoming-c I instead argue
against the existence of relations between spatial locations and between
spatial objects, such as the relation at a distance from that the
empirical mind might imagine exists between, for example, the lion and the
zebra.
[48]
In the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge University
Press, 1995) pp. 562-63, Butchvarov describes what is meant by “metaphysical
realism”:
Metaphysical
realism, in the widest sense, [is] the view that (a) there are real objects
(usually the view is concerned with spatiotemporal objects), (b) they exist
independently of our experience or our knowledge of them, and (c) they have
properties that enter into relations independently of the concepts which we
understand them or of the language with which we describe them.
Anti-realism is any view that rejects one or more of these theses,
though if (a) is rejected the rejection of (b) and (c) follows trivially…
In
discussion of universals [properties], metaphysical realism is the view that
there are universals…
Perhaps the best summary of what the realist theories of reality are that I
have seen is the summary given by Dreyfus 1997, 53-58.
[49]
It is interesting to note that this model of atomism would solve some of the
mysteries about the Big Bang theory. For example, it is often considered
mysterious as to how an initial point (0-dimensional) of the universe (the
singularity point of the universe before the expansion of the universe)
could begin expanding, and could thereby become larger
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The
atoms, while considered by the conceptual mind to be at distances from one
another, are nevertheless indistinguishable.
The atoms are the same items, despite the fact
that they are theorized by the empirical mind to be distinct: the mind
theorizes that there is more than one object in reality (and thus more than
one atom), but there is only one. One can refer to ultimate
reality as “atoms,” as if atoms are distinct, since the empirical mind
imagines that the atoms are distinguishable. But one can also refer to
reality as “instances of the one atom that makes up everything;” this would
be the appropriate way to describe ultimate reality. This is similar to the
way physicists often consider the apparently irreducible particles they
study—such as electrons or quarks. French and Krause write: “Electrons,
like the other elementary particles, have no names, have no identity, and
cannot be distinguished from one another” (French and Krause 1996, 27).
Since the atoms are indistinguishable, they are not countable, as when one
counts items: 1, 2, 3, 4,… (i.e., atom a1, atom a2,
atom a3, atom a4, …). This is because the atoms are
indistinguishable. Rather, one would have to use the following
symbolization, a1, a1, a1,…, in order to
label and describe ultimate reality. One could use a1, a2,
a3, and so on, if one merely understood that even though atoms a1,
a2, a3, and a4 are not overlapping (they do
not coincide) and are theorized to be a distances from one another, it is
nevertheless the case that a1 = a2 = a3 = a4.
One could use the a1, a2, a3, a4
symbolization, as long as one understood that talking in terms of a1
and a2, for example, where the “1” and “2” symbolization make
atoms a1 and a2 appear to be distinct since 1 ≠ 2,
such distinctions are merely a construct or intuition of the conceptual
non-nirvanic mind. It is common for philosophers and physicists to still
discuss electrons as if they are distinguishable individuals (e.g.,
“electron a is at x and electron b is at y, where x ≠ y, which might make it
appear that a ≠ b), even though they are indistinguishable, since this makes
more sense to the ordinary, non-nirvanic, human understanding of reality. I
will do the same when discussing philosophic atoms: one can assert

than a point
(3-dimensional). But the model of atomism just described may get around this
problem if at time t = t0,
continuum-many points overlapped (coincided) and therefore gathered in a
region that is the size of one point, and the Big Bang explosion merely
consisted of these points ceasing to overlap (coincide), and instead they
spread out.
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that atom a1
is at x and atom a2 is at y, where a1 and a2
do not coincide, even though a1 = a2.
Before describing abstract atomism, I will discuss a few issues for the sake
of clarification. Atoms are real, and empirical items are conceptual. To
understand how this can be, consider an example: a flock of birds. The
flock, as a single whole item over-and-above the birds, is a product of the
imagination, since the birds do not touch or connect, and the atoms that the
birds are made of (i.e., that give rise to the appearance of there being a
bird) do not touch or connect.[50]
Without any touching or connecting, there is no means by which the birds (or
the particles that compose the birds) can come together to form one
mereological item (one whole item with distinct parts, where the whole is
distinct from the parts). For those reasons, there is no flock; there are
only the birds. This line of reasoning could be given for any item that is
alleged to be a composite item. This indicates that there are only atoms,
and to apprehend items that are non-imaginary is to have direct awareness of
atoms. The nirvanic mind has direct awareness of the atoms that make up
empirical reality, and which empirical reality can be reduced to.[51]
According to the typical accounts in physics and philosophy, through the
centuries, the reasons for why there is motion are typically asserted
to be due to one of the following: (a) the internal nature of matter; (b)
fields, forces, and various interconnections (relations) between pieces of
matter (or space); or (c) direct interactions (touching) between
bodies. (There are also mixtures of (a) – (c) found in physics and
philosophy.)
(c) can be described as follows by Pyle, in a passage about seventeenth
century mechanistic philosophy:
Rest and uniform motion are alike states of bodies; changes of state
require the action of forces; bodies resist, with a strength dependent on
their quantity of matter, any attempt to compel them to change their state
(Pyle, 1995 : 595-96).

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If reality is composed of point-sized unconnected unrelated atoms, as I
argued elsewhere, that would indicate that contacting between any atoms, or
any bodies made up of atoms, does not exist, and our perceiving real contact
between items is an illusion. Therefore, even though the non-nirvanic
empirical mind might believe there are direct interactions between empirical
objects, it appears however that direct contact may not occur at all in
reality, which would leave only (a) and (b) to consider.
Jammer discusses the widespread use of force and fields and relations that
have popped up through the history of philosophy:
Force as a regulative agent in nature appears, perhaps for the first time in
Greek thought, in Empedocles’ doctrine of love and strife, and in Anaxagoras’
theory of the mind (nous). Both doctrines aimed at an explanation of the
causes of motion… These agents as causes of motion may rightfully be
interpreted as “forces”, although they were not held as immaterial, but as
extended in space and corporeal (Jammer, 1999 : 25).
Plato interpreted Empedocles’ two agents as attraction and repulsion,
stating that their operation is conceived in an alternative sequence,
whereas, according to Plato, the same forces operate simultaneously in
Heraclitus’ conception of nature (Jammer, 1999 : 27).
…Aristotle recognizes two kinds of forces, the Platonic conception of force
inherent in matter, which he calls “nature” (physis), and force as an
emanation from substance, the force of push and pull, causing the motion in
a second object, and not in itself… For his mechanics, Aristotle confines
himself solely to the concept of force as the agency involved in pulling or
pushing, and ignores the Platonic concept of force as inherent in matter or
what we may call today energy (Jammer, 1999 : 35-36).
In his search for possible other phenomena in which the attractive force of
the sun may become perceptible or demonstrable, Kepler was thus left with
only one possibility: Gilbert’s magnetic forces. No wonder that Kepler, when
writing his Tertius in terveniens, is convinced beyond any shade of
doubt that his astronomical computations only confirmed his previous
assumptions about the importance of
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magnetic forces. In article No. 51 of this short treatise Kepler asserts
emphatically: “The planets are magnets and are driven around by the sun by
magnetic force.”…
Kepler imagined these magnetic forces, emanating from the central body such
as the sun, to be like giant arms propelling the planets on their
appropriate orbits. He thought it necessary that for this purpose the
central body itself should be in rotational motion (Jammer, 1999 : 89-90).
Jammer also discusses how through the history of physics, many
physicists, such as Newton, have considered forces and fields to be
relations (Jammer, 1999 : 200):
With the rise of Newtonian dynamics and its interpretation along the lines
of Boscovich, Kant, and Spencer, the concept of force rose almost to the
status of an almighty potentate of totalitarian rule over the phenomena. And
yet, since the very beginning of its early rise to power, revolutionary
forces were at work (Keill, Berkely, Maupertuis, Hume, d’Alembert) which in
due time led to its dethronement (Mach, Kirchhoff, Hertz). This movement in
mathematical physics, from the time of Newton onward, was essentially an
attempt to explain physical phenomena in terms of mass points and their
spatial relations (Jammer, 1999 : 242).
This continues up until Einstein. Stenger writes:
So general relativity does away with the need to introduce the gravitational
field. However, in its place another field is introduced: the metric field
of space-time… [T]his metric field was not the same form at every point in
space-time, but varied from point-to-point… Thus the metric of space-time is
a field, denoting the geometry of each point in space and time (Stenger,
2000 : 76).
The
word “metric” in Stenger’s passage denotes a relation that connects points.
I however found that all relations between distinct items are apparently
impossible in another publication. Here is a passage from the conclusion of
that article:
If my preceding arguments are sound, relations between regions larger than a
basic building block of space are impossible, and there are no relations
between non-identical basic building blocks of space. It appears that if
this is the
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case, then all basic building blocks in nature are apparently unrelated
to one another, and all basic units of space are unconnected, and
theorists who makes use of such relations between non-identical basic
building blocks of space or non-collocated basic building blocks of matter,
must explain how they are coherent (Grupp
forthcoming-c, from the conclusion).
If my argumentation elsewhere is correct, and there are no relations between
entities, it would mean there is no explanation for why there is motion in
terms of forces, fields, and relations between entities, since if there are
no connections of any sort (connections that are forces, fields, or
relations) between items, there cannot be forces, fields, or relations that
bind items together. Without interconnecting or touching
between particles or philosophic atoms, there is no explanation of motion of
objects in terms of (b) or (c).
In apparent agreement with my reasoning elsewhere, where I fond that forces,
fields, and relations do not exist, Gribbon discusses that since the birth
of quantum physics, fields are now considered by quantum physicists to
merely to be aggregations of particles—fields are made merely of particles:
In classical physics, a field is something which stretches out from an
object and conveys a force (there are really only two forces in classical
physics, gravity and electromagnetism). The force can be described in terms
of ripples in the field. Or waves. But in quantum mechanics we know that
waves can be described in terms of particles. So the concept of a field in
the classical sense is replaced by the concept of particles which carry
forces as they are exchanged between other quantum entities. The classic
example is the photon, which mediates the electromagnetic force... (Gribbon,
1998, 316-17)
Gribbin notes that a field is in fact an assemblage of particles. Therefore,
motion appears to be to do with the particles themselves. Above we found
that motion deriving from forces and connections between bodies, or by way
of direct contact of bodies, does not occur. The only option left then is
motion comes about by an internal principle of matter. I will next explain
that what this (perhaps vaguely described) principle might involve, and that
this principle can be understood with an understanding of the very nature of
the abstract Buddhist atoms replacing from moment to moment. This replacing
at
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112 The Indian International
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the ultimate level
would give rise to the appearance of motion at the chemical or macroscopic
level, and thus would be the cause of empirically imagined motion.
If
ultimate reality creates the illusory empirical reality that the empirical
observer believes exists due to their non-nirvanic awareness, then it would
seem that the ultimate level would have to consist of items that are in
motion (that replace) in order for the illusory empirical domain to involve
any imaginary motion. If that were the case, motion would have to be the
result of something akin to the remaining option mentioned above: (a) motion
is a “force inherent in matter” (Jammer, 1999 : 35-36) To my knowledge,
however, nobody has ever explained how this works, or what exactly this
force is, without reverting to mysterious supernatural explanations, or to
mysterious platonistic explanations. But I will argue that since Buddhist
atomism is describable by the atomism I discussed above, then there is, in
Buddhism atomism, is a simple explanation for precisely why replacing
occurs, and therefore why the illusory empirical domain of reality
that is made of real atoms thereby involves motion. It is an explanation
that would describe motion in non-supernatural, uncomplicated terms, and
that I have not seen before in any philosophic texts.
Some
might wonder why there is replacement at all, or why the atomic building
blocks of reality are in motion (i.e., why they replace), thus giving rise
to replacing presents. Can’t there merely be an unchanging reality where
there is no motion and no change, and thus no replacement of presents? (If
this were the case, and if ultimate reality were composed of
indistinguishable and unconnected atomic building blocks that do not
replace, then ultimate reality would apparently resemble Brahman:
reality is one, is unstructured, partless, unmoving, and unchanging, (See
Grupp
2004c and forthcoming-b.))
Abstract Buddhist atomism consists of a number of aspects:
i.
The number of
atoms that make up reality is infinite (and dense, so there are
À1-many
indistinguishable atoms: a1, a2, a3, a4,…;
this will be argued in an upcoming article).
ii.
If there are
infinite indistinguishable atoms composing reality, if an atom, call it a1,
comes into existence and thus is added to the atoms, or is destroyed and
thus is taken out, the number of atoms making up reality does not change:
there is still infinite atoms.
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iii.
Mathematical
description of the universe at any present is as follows: “an infinite set
of atoms”. For that reason, it is unclear which is the correct mathematical
description of reality: the description with atom a1 in
reality, or not in reality. Since the atoms are indistinguishable
from one another, both descriptions of reality seem to be correct at
any given present. Just by theorizing that reality is composed of
À1-many
indistinguishable atoms, the aforementioned issue arises: the precise state
of the atoms is not determinable (it is uncertain), since it is unclear
whether or not instance a1 exists.
iv. To
correctly describe reality, reality at a given present must be described
simultaneously as having and not having a1, but
that appears to be impossible. It is however not impossible if there
are two states (two present moments) of reality that are consecutive
states: state-1 of reality, which is without a1, is replaced
by state-2 of reality, which has a1. In the first state, present
a1 does not exist, and then in the second state (which replaces
the first) atom a1 does exist. On this account, reality can never
be considered as an enduring, unchanging set of atoms, since reality must be
describable as changing by the process of atoms being added into reality.
The following diagram may show how this works:
At
present p1, there is no
instance of atom a1.
|
At
present p2, p1 has been replaced, and atom a1
exists, and is one of the infinite new atoms that exist.
|
-
Why do we have to describe reality as
involving consecutive states? This can be answered by considering the
following. Why do we have to describe reality with and without a1
at any given present? Because both descriptions of reality are correct,
but they cannot describe reality at one durationless present,
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114 The Indian International Journal of
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since that
would be impossible: at present p reality has atom a1 and does
not have atom a1. So a present cannot stay itself, it must
change—i.e., it must replace. Furthermore, all of reality must
replace upon a1 coming into existence or being destroyed, since
reality consists of instances of the one atom that exists, and if one
instance of the atom (a1) alters in any way, that would indicate
that all of reality has changed. So that indicates that all of reality must
alter. If all of reality must alter, then all of reality must replace.
If reality were only described as one state of infinite atoms, it could not
be a complete description, since infinite atoms could be added in to
mathematically describe the same reality. Thus reality must have
replacing presents, where at each present reality consists of new
instances of atoms. Only this way would reality have a complete mathematical
description—with and without a1 (it is just the case that it
happens over the coming into being of different present moments). On this
model of atomism, due to the mathematics involved, atoms apparently must
come into existence, and thus all of reality must change. That’s the
“engine” behind the R-theory of time: It cannot be the case that the present
does not replace since that would amount to the state of, and the set of
instances of, the atoms that make up reality being fixed certain
(determinable, known), which is not possible for a set of continuum-many
indistinguishable point-sized philosophic atoms.
Since philosophic atoms make up all of reality, they make up quantum reality
(whereby quantum reality makes up the level of reality that chemists study,
and so on). (It could be the case that some of the particles that quantum
theorists have discovered are philosophic atoms, but that is debatable, and
more study is needed to ascertain if that is the case.) If it could be
explained just how the moment-to-moment replacing of presents occurs, it may
be the case that such replacement activity would give rise to quantum
reality, which in turn would give rise to macroscopic reality—where, of
course, only the level of the atoms is real, however, and the other levels
are conceptual).
According to the philosophy of abstract Buddhist atomism, the basic building
blocks—which are atoms of energy, irreducible momentary pieces of
existence—emerge in a lawless manner from the void. This also appears to
possibly be in accord with the
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description of the quantum foam, as it is occasionally refereed to, that
physicists have theorized makes up all of reality. In writing about the very
tiniest levels of reality that physicists discuss, the physicist Brian
Greene shows that the nature of reality described by physicists may appear
similar to the reality of abstract Buddhist atomism:
As gravitational fields are reflected by curvature, these quantum
fluctuations manifest themselves as increasingly violent distortions of the
surrounding space… By probing to even smaller scales,… we see that the
random quantum mechanical undulations in the gravitational field correspond
to such severe warpings of space that it no longer resembles a gently
geometrical objects… Rather, it takes on… frothing, turbulent, twisted form.
John Wheeler coined the term quantum foam to describe the frenzy revealed by
such an ultramicroscopic examination of space (and time)—it describes an
unfamiliar arena of the universe in which the conventional notions of left
and right, back and forth, up and down (and even before and after) lose
their meaning… [The ultramicroscopic level is a] roiling frenzy of quantum
foam… [A]s we recede to more ordinary distances…, the random, violent
small-scale undulations cancel each other out… [T]he fabric of space-time
appears to be smooth except when examined with ultramicroscopic precision
(Greene, 1999 : 127-29).
If abstract Buddhist atomism does indeed correlate to the fundamental level
of reality that physicists have theorized about, it would appear that the
theory of abstract atomism would describe ultimately why reality is composed
of replacing presents, and more interestingly, why exactly there is motion
at all (why presents replace at all) at the ultimate level.
When considering the nature of the quantum vacuum (empty space) that physics
describe, it also appears to be a seething, random and unpredictable,
“boiling” froth[52]
of particles. Davies writes:

[52]
It is interesting to note the way that Buddha also used the themes of
boiling, froth, and foaminess just as Greene and Davies do: “When
a man considers this world as a bubble of froth, and as the illusion of an
appearance, then the king of death has no
power over him.” (Dhammapada 170)
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When physicists began to study the quantum theory of fields, they discovered
that a vacuum was not at all what it had long appeared to be—just empty
space devoid of substance and activity… The source of the trickery can be
traced to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle as it relates to the behavior
of energy… [T]he law of conservation of energy can be suspended by quantum
effects for a very short interval of time. During this brief duration energy
can be ‘borrowed’ for all manner of purposes, one of which is to create
particles. Any particles produced in this way will be pretty short-lived,
because the energy tied up in them has to be repaid after a minute fraction
of a second. Nevertheless, particles are permitted to pop out of nowhere,
enjoying a fleeting existence, before fading once again into oblivion. This
evanescent activity cannot be prevented. Though space can be made as empty
as it can possibly be, there will always be a host of these temporary
‘ghost’ particles… The temporary ‘ghost’ particles cannot be seen, even
though they may leave physical traces of their brief existence. They are, in
fact, a form of ‘virtual’ particle, similar to messenger particles, but with
nothing on the ‘ends of the line’ to send or receive the message. They
travel from emptiness to emptiness…
What might appear to be empty space is, therefore, a seething
ferment of virtual particles. A vacuum is not inert and featureless, but
alive with throbbing energy and vitality. A ‘real’ particle such as an
electron must always be viewed against this background of frenetic activity.
When an electron moves through space, it is actually swimming in a sea of
ghost particles of all varieties—virtual particles, quarks, and messengers,
entangled in a complex mêlée. The presence of the electron will distort this
irreducible vacuum activity (Davies, 1984 : 104-105).
If I understand the positions of physicists on the Planck scale (as
described by Greene) and the void (as described by Davies), these accounts
of quantum reality may be in line with abstract Buddhist atomism since both
involve momentary particles that emerge from nothing in an unpredictable
manner. But this could only be verified if it could known with a high level
of precision what the nature of Buddhist ultimate reality is like (which
involves the random production of instances of non-concrete abstract atoms
coming into
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existence from nothing), and what the nature of ultimate reality to the
physicists is like (which involves quantum foaminess). But until those
issues were shown with certainty, it must be considered highly speculative
to consider abstract atomism and quantum foaminess to be similar theories.[53]
5.2
Conclusion Part 2: The Whole World is Burning
If my preceding arguments are correct, I do not see a way to avoid the
conclusion that the R-theory of time is the best theory of time we have been
offered. There are no times that contact or connect to one another. Only a
present moment exists, and the present moment replaces itself, where a new
reality comes into being every instant. Since causation is behind the
Buddhist philosophy of time, this article is an account of Buddhist
causation, which involves real causation, and involves empirical causation.
Empirical causation is mental and non-nirvanic, and transcendental causation
is real. The R-theory of time indicates that the present moments of reality
are now replacing one another, where if one had direct awareness of
reality one would know reality as transcendental efficient moments
(Stcherbatsky, F. Th. 1962 (1930). Buddhist Logic. Volume 1. Page
129: “[c]ause, efficiency or moment are but different names for the
same thing”). From non-nirvanic awareness, one experiences imaginary causal
connections between moments and thus fabricates the illusion of persistence
and duration of objects. But when one experiences reality, one only
experiences the efficient moments, rapidly replacing one another, like the
flames of a fire. Buddha: “…the whole world is burning.” The non-nirvanic
observer, unaware of the fiery, boiling nature of reality, is unaware

[53]
One issue that I imagine some readers will have regarding the reasoning of
this subsection is given in this endnote. Quantum foam is typically
considered to be a theory involving chronons: time atoms that involve
an irreducible duration. And I imagine some will complain that I cannot
compare quantum foam with the R-theory of time since the R-theory involves a
durationless present, rather than a present that is a chronon. But above, in
endnote 32, I discussed simple reasoning as to why a chronon appears to be
impossible: it appears that durations cannot be partless (cannot be composed
of just one irreducible unit of time), and it appears that a present cannot
have more than one instant making it up. For that reason, I discuss quantum
foam in the context of this article under the assumption that eventually
physicists will discover that the ultimate level involves time points rather
than chronons as the items that replace.
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that they will not exist beyond this present instant, and that any volition
or hope is unneeded and illusory, and is based on the misery of unreality.[54]
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Chisholm,
Roderick. 1989. On Metaphysics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
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Cohn, Anthony, and
Varzi, Achille. 2003. “Mereotopological Connection”. Journal of
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Cruise, Henry.
1983. “Early Buddhism: Some Recent Misconceptions”. Philosophy East and
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Davies, Paul.
1984. Superforce. New York: Touchstone.
Dreyfus, Georges B. 1997. Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy
and Its Tibetan Interpretations. Albany: Suny Press.
Greene, Brian.
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Gribbon, John.
1998. Q is for Quantum: An Encyclopedia of Particle Physics. New
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[54]
I am grateful to Roger Jackson for helpful comments while I was working on
this article. I am also grateful to Dave Charlton and John D. Martin III for
talking through a few issues in this paper with me, which consequently
helped me in the process of writing this article.
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Grupp,
Jeffrey. 2005. "The Impossibility of Temporal Relations Between
Non-Identical Times: New Arguments for
Presentism."
Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy.
Volume 1. Number 18. Pages 91-125. (This
paper can be read at www.abstractatom.com.)
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